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LAW, LEGITIMACY, AND THE MALIGNED ADVERB
James M. Donovan*
ABSTRACT
The standard rules for good writing dictate that adverbs should be
avoided. They undermine the effectiveness of the text and detract from the
author's point. Lawyers have incorporated this general rule, leading them
not only to avoid adverbs in their own writings but also to overlook them in
the writings of others, including statutes. However, as philosopher Michael
Oakeshott has argued, law happens not in the rules but in the adverbs.
Through its adverbs the law allows moral space for the citizen to consent to
the social order, rather than merely conforming to an imposed command to
comply. To become desensitized to the power of adverbs or to presume
that they are weak and unnecessary leads the reader not only to misunder-
stand the operation of the rule, but also to overlook the moral aspect that
separates a society based on law from a power-based regime of command.
I. INTRODUCTION
Whatever their occupation, everyone should strive to write compe-
tently. Attention to good writing instills clarity of thought and a vitality of
expression that benefits any line of expressive work. For lawyers, this skill
is particularly critical, and the design of legal education curricula reflects
this priority. While other professional programs rarely provide any cour-
sework focusing on the mechanics of writing, law schools typically require
two semesters, and often offer more. This default practice has been ele-
vated to a requirement in the new ABA accreditation standards which now
include language that law schools must offer "one writing experience in the
first year and at least one additional writing experience after the first year,
both of which are faculty supervised." 1 While business students concen-
trate on numbers, and medical students on bodies, for law students, the
emphasis is on words.2 The right word, at the right time, can determine
fates.
* James M. Donovan is Director and James and Mary Lassiter Associate Professor of Law at
the University of Kentucky College of Law. An earlier version of this essay received the 2014 AALL/
LexisNexis Call for Paper Short Form award. The author thanks Jacob Gershman for his comments on
previous drafts.
1. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ABA STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR AP-
PROVAL OF LAw SCHOOLS 2014-2015 16 [Standard 303(a)(2)] (American Bar Association, 2014), availa-
ble at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/misc/legal-education/Standards/2014-
2015 aba standards and rulesof procedureforapproval of law-schools.bookmarked.authcheck
dam.pdf.
2. See, e.g., DAVID MELLINKOFF, THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW vii (1963) ("The law is a profes-
sion of words.").
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The craft of effective legal writing tracks the skills of good writing gen-
erally.3 The goal of all writing is communication between writers and read-
ers, and shared grammatical conventions remove unnecessary obstacles to
this rapport. Rules drilled into future attorneys draw heavily upon the
guidelines expected of all writers. Although style differences are recog-
nized for genre and format - one wouldn't express himself in a dissertation
in the same manner as in a short story - acknowledged deviations from the
standard practices rarely arise simply because one is writing in law rather
than, say, anthropology.4
This essay briefly considers one exception to the otherwise comparable
writing training offered ordinary writers and attorneys. Despite a well-es-
tablished tradition of discouraging the use of adverbs, lawyers have sound
reasons to include them within legal texts. Rather than being distracting
ornamentation, adverbs are often the most relevant part of a legal rule. To
become desensitized to the power of adverbs leads the reader not only to
misconstrue the practical operation of the law, but also to overlook the
moral aspect of autonomy and choice that separates the rule of law from a
power-based regime of command.
II. SKEPTICISM ABOUT ADVERBS
The received wisdom maintains that better writers avoid adverbs.
"The adverb is not your friend," Stephen King pronounced in On Writing:
A Memoir of the Craft, his autobiographical summary of tips for writing
well.5 King's distrust of adverbs is widely shared among professional writ-
ers. For instance, Mark Twain said that he was emotionally "dead to ad-
verbs; they cannot excite me."6 Graham Greene praised the skill of Evelyn
Waugh for "a complete absence of the beastly adverb" within his works, for
these are "far more damaging to a writer than an adjective." 7 Perhaps the
general consensus is stated most concisely by poet Theodore Roethke: "In
order to write good stuff you have to hate adverbs."'
Elaborating on his advice that the "road to hell is paved with ad-
verbs," 9 King tells aspiring authors that
[a]dverbs, like the passive voice, seem to have been created
with the timid writer in mind. With the passive voice, the
3. Robert C. Farrell, Why Grammar Matters: Conjugating Verbs in Modern Legal Opinions, 40
LOYOLA UNIV. CHIC. L.J. 1 (2008) (reviewing instances when courts have found it necessary to consider
the legal implications of statutory text's grammar relating to mood, voice, tense, person, and verbals).
4. While true of texts, a notable exception concerns the use of footnotes for extensive reference
citation in legal writing that is without parallel in other disciplines. See, e.g., Jack L. Landau, Footnote
Folly: A History of Citation Creep in the Law, 67 OR. ST. B. BULL. 19, 20 (Nov. 2006) ("According to
several academic commentators, an article's footnote count has come to be a sure indicator of its re-
spectability, with the current goal being 400 to 500 per article.").
5. STEPHEN KING, ON WRITING: A MEMOIR OF THE CRAFT 124 (2000).
6. Mark Twain, Contributors' Club, 45(272) THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY 849, 850 (June 1880).
7. GRAHAM GREENE, WAYS OF ESCAPE 225 (Lester & Orpen Dennys, 1980).
8. ALLAN SEAGER, THE GLASS HOUSE: THE LIFE OF THEODORE ROETHKE 184 (1968).
9. KING, supra note 5, at 125.
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writer usually expresses fear of not being taken seriously; it
is the voice of little boys wearing shoepolish mustaches and
little girls clumping around in Mommy's high heels. With
adverbs, the writer usually tells us he or she is afraid he/she
isn't expressing himself/herself clearly, that he or she is not
getting the point or the picture across.' °
So commonplace has this advice become that King feels no obligation
to defend more fully the nature of the peculiar danger he fears adverbs
hold for the unwary scribe. Although touching on these themes, King's
message was framed more directly in similar counsel a century earlier from
essayist Walter Bagehot:
Cautious men have many adverbs, "usually," "nearly," "al-
most"; safe men begin, "it may be advanced"; you never
know precisely what their premises are, nor what their con-
clusion is; they go tremulously like a timid rider; they turn
hither and thither; they do not go straight across a subject,
like a masterly mind.1
Adverbs transform a declaration into a tentative query. They diffuse a
statement's power and belittle its significance. An attached adverb dilutes
confident assertion into polite suggestion and deflates bold proclamations
into beige, insipid possibilities. In this view, adverbs, like belladonna, are
similarly toxic and should be employed sparingly and only by knowledgea-
ble experts in the art.
Adverbs, we are instructed, are intrinsically weak and inevitably weak-
ening. The warning would be fully warranted when they add little value to
a sentence, but worse, like poor mortar in a wall, adverbs destabilize a
text's overall structure. The adverb is not simply an empty and eliminable
appendage; it is a contaminating excrescence that exsanguinates the text of
all significance.' 2
Strong stuff, but the polemic goes further. While King discourages an
adverb's appearance in all contexts, he mandates complete prohibition with
verbs of attribution like to say. In this suggestion King echoes advice from
Strunk and White's classic writing guide, The Elements of Style:
10. Id. at 124.
11. Walter Bagehot, The First Edinburgh Reviewers, 47 LITELL'S LIVING AGE 449, 461 (1855).
12. Much of the generalized distaste for adverbs may be attributable to a failure to discriminate
between intensifiers such as very, obviously, and clearly, and adverbs used for other purposes, such as to
indicate the actor's state of mind. One study found, true to the negative view in which adverbs are held,
that "the odds of reversal can actually be higher for appellants who have high intensifier usage rates."
Lance N. Long & William F. Christensen, Clearly, Using Intensifiers is Very Bad-Or Is It?, 45 IDAHO
L. REV. 171, 185 (2008). This effect, however, was mitigated when the deciding judge also tended to
overuse adverbial intensifiers. Id. The same can be said for adverbial hedges such as almost, predomi-
nantly, and relatively. See Steven Pinker, Why Academics Stink at Writing, 61(5) CHRON. HIGHER
EDUC. 5 (Sept. 26, 2014).
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It is seldom advisable to tell all. Be sparing, for instance, in
the use of adverbs after "he said," "she replied," and the
like: "he said consolingly"; "she replied grumblingly." Let
the conversation itself disclose the speaker's manner or con-
dition. Dialogue heavily weighted with adverbs after the at-
tributive verb is cluttery and annoying. Inexperienced
writers not only overwork their adverbs but load their at-
tributives with explanatory verbs: "he consoled," "she con-
gratulated." They do this, apparently, in the belief that the
word said is always in need of support, or because they have
been told to do it by experts in the art of bad writing. 3
Neither King's nor Struck and White's text considers the possibility
that repetition of the same verb strikes the reader as dull and mechanical.
Surely the English language recognizes valid reasons to use more than one
verb to signal a speech act other than to create new sources of error, or at
least poor form. Nor do these stylists allow for contexts where joining ad-
verbs to verbs of attribution may clarify, not weaken, the author's voice.
Consider the following illustration. English is not a tonal language. 4
Despite lacking this semantic dimension, often an English sentence's mean-
ing changes significantly when read with one inflection rather than another.
For example, the sentence "Alice is supposed to have left" is facially am-
biguous. On one reading the speaker states that Alice had an obligation to
have vacated the premises by a set time, with which we have reason to
expect she has complied (i.e., supposed = required). Alternatively, the
speaker is communicating a belief held by others that as he speaks Alice is
likely to have already departed, whatever her reasons (i.e., supposed =
thought).
During actual conversation, this difference is marked by the inflection
of the second syllable. In the case of requirement, the second syllable is
explosive, almost staccato, but in that of reported belief, the syllable gets
drawn out, an implied question inviting affirmation or denial. Because
these differences in intonation cannot be marked in the text, indicating one
reading over the other may necessitate violation of King's rules. The writer
may avoid confusion either by using adverbs (e.g., she said confidently), or
perhaps by "shooting the attribution verb full of steroids," and cheekily
inserting something other than the naked "she said."15 When one is at-
tempting to mirror the nuances of natural language, the need for adverbs
may be more complex than that captured by the default avoidance rule
favored by composition guidebooks.
13. WILLIAM STRUNK, JR. & E.B. WHITE, THE ELEMENTS OF STYLE 75 (4th ed. 2000).
14. See e.g., Chang Ke, Dichotic Listening with Chinese and English Tasks, 21 J. PSYCHOLINGUIS-
Tic RES. 463, 464 (1992) ("[L]anguages such as Chinese and Thai, in which the variation of tones over
syllable-sized units has linguistic significance, are categorized as tone languages, whereas languages like
English and French, in which the variation of pitch is not phonemic, are categorized as nontone
languages.").
15. KInG, supra note 5, at 126.
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Ill. THE GROWTH OF LEGAL ADVERBS
Even if we were to grant that King's position offers solid advice for
ordinary authors, we should not leap to the conclusion that his warning
against adverbs thereby serves equally well for legal writers. An attorney's
relationship to adverbs differs from that of the general public. One must
account for this reality when framing the rules for legal writing.
When law students absorb King's rule that adverbs are weak and
"timid," they learn not only to avoid them in their own writing, but also to
discount adverbs encountered in the writings of others. Schooled to be-
lieve that adverbs perform no real work, or at least no work worth doing in
their own compositions, law students expect that the central meaning of a
text can be rendered accurately without noting the adverbial embellish-
ments. This need not be a conscious strategy, but one that reflexively
emerges after repeated admonitions from trusted sources that adverbs are
"beastly."
Yet any such habit will bedevil the student's efforts to understand the
law. Contrary to the ordinary view that adverbs are superfluous, law gen-
erally, and criminal law especially, emerges through its adverbs. Whether a
deed has been performed may be a given, but the heavy legal lifting begins
when ascertaining whether it was done excessively, negligently, knowingly,
wantonly, recklessly, or any of a range of other possible legally relevant
ways of doing.
Both the importance and the difficulty of reading adverbs correctly in
statutes can be seen in a recent case heard by the United States Supreme
Court.16 In Flores-Figueroa v. United States, the Court considered the qual-
ifying reach of a statute's adverb. 7 The Aggravated Identity Statute re-
quires that the defendant be found guilty and assigned enhanced
punishment if he "knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful
authority, a means of identification of another person."'" Flores-Figueroa
was a Mexican citizen who used fake identification and Social Security
numbers that belonged to someone else. Although he conceded that he
was guilty of the predicate offense of presenting false documents, he ar-
gued that in order to be found guilty of the aggravated crime, and thus
liable to the two-year sentencing enhancement, the Government had to
prove that he knew that the false identification numbers belonged to an-
other person.19 The state, however, claimed that the statute's adverb
"knowingly" did not reach to the final phrase, but only modified the
16. Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646 (2009); see also United States v. Yermtan, 468
U.S. 63 (1984): Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985); LAWRENCE SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF
JUDGES 67-75 (1993) (discussing the Yermian and Liparota decisions).
17. Flores-Figueroa, 556 U.S. at 647.
18. 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1) (2014).
19. Flores-Figueroa, 556 U.S. at 648.
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verbs.2° The Court granted certiorari on this question, on which there had
been a circuit split.
21
Justice Breyer, siding with Flores-Figueroa, reasoned that "[t]he man-
ner in which the courts ordinarily interpret criminal statutes is fully consis-
tent with ... ordinary English usage. "22 In this case, the relevant premise
was that
[i]n ordinary English, where a transitive verb has an object,
listeners in most contexts assume that an adverb (such as
knowingly) that modifies the transitive verb tells the listener
how the subject performed the entire action, including the
object as set forth in the sentence. Thus, if a bank official
says, "Smith knowingly transferred the funds to his
brother's account," we would normally understand the bank
official's statement as telling us that Smith knew the account
was his brother S.23
Although Flores-Figueroa holds that the proper method to construe
adverbs is wholly a matter of ordinary language use (i.e., the ordinary lan-
guage use is not simply one of a set of factors to be considered by a
court),24 the case offers this outcome against a background of competing
strategies that the Court might have invoked either in lieu of or in addition
to the solution it favored .2  Available alternatives include deference to the
20. Id.
21. Supporting the petitioner were the First (United States. v. Godin, 534 F.3d 51 (1st Cir. 2008)),
Ninth (United States v. Miranda-Lopez, 532 F.3d 1034 (9th Cir. 2008)), and D.C. (United States v.
Villanueva-Sotelo, 515 F.3d 1234 (D.C. Cir. 2008)) Circuits: supporting the Government were the
Eighth (United States v. Mendoza-Gonzalez, 520 F.3d 912 (8th Cir. 2008)), Eleventh (United States. v.
Hurtado, 508 F.3d 603 (11th Cir. 2007)), and Fourth (United States v. Montejo, 442 F.3d 213 (4th Cir.
2006)) Circuits.
22. Flores-Figueroa, 556 U.S. at 652. Although he does not provide authority for this conclusion,
Justice Breyer could have referred to the Brief of Professors of Linguistics as Amici Curiae in Support
of Neither Party at 2, Ignacio Carlos Flores-Figueroa v. United States, No. 08-108 (2008) ("it is a mis-
take to say that knowingly modifies only the statute's verbs. Rather, it modifies the entire predicate
consisting of the verbs and their direct object."). Earlier, Frederick Schauer had outlined the reasons
why courts would reasonably favor such plain meaning construction strategies, even when presump-
tively superior, but more idiosyncratic linguistic alternatives were available to them. Frederick Schauer,
Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function of Plain Meaning, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 231, 232
(1991) ("But for the Court to lessen its reliance on plain meaning would serve only to substitute for the
community's contingent normative choices the equally contingent and equally normative choices of
individual interpreters.").
23. Flores-Figueroa, 556 U.S. at 650.
24. Id. at 651 ("The Government has not provided us with a single example of a sentence that,
when used in a typical fashion, would lead the hearer to believe that the word "knowingly" modifies
only a transitive verb without the full object.").
25. This tendency to offer linguistic reasoning as determinative even when other, equally reason-
able outcomes can be imagined, has been noted by Lawrence Sloan. SLOAN, supra note 16, at 27 ("the
appeal of neutral linguistic principles as justification for a decision will loom especially large when the
judge's 'real reasons' for the decision are not ones that are properly articulated in a judicial opinion.").
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ease of proof of elements by prosecutors26 and consideration whether fail-
ing to extend the mens rea requirements could result in criminalizing other-
wise innocent actions.27 Lower courts continue to rely upon these
interpretive alternatives even after Flores-Figueroa in at least some con-
texts, such as offenses involving minors and firearm crimes.
28
Questions on the reading of adverbs are not unusual within the courts;
a simple search identifies over three thousand such cases. More interesting
is the observation that these issues have consistently grown and appear
more frequently on the courts' dockets. Figure 1 shows that cases concern-
ing the reading of adverbs represent a greater percentage of court
decisions.29










In real terms, this trend of presenting to courts problems
the reading of adverbs at least doubles every ten years:
concerning
26. United States v. Flores-Garcia, 198 F.3d 1119, 1122 (9th Cir. 2000) ("If the defendant's
knowledge of the reason why an alien is inadmissible is an element of section 1327, the government
would be required to prove that the defendant knew what was in the mind of a consular officer, the
Attorney General, or the Secretary of State.").
27. Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419, 426 (1985).
28. Leonid Traps, "Knowingly" Ignorant. Mens Rea Distribution in Federal Criminal Law after
Flores-Figueroa, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 628, 644-652 (2012).
29. The total number of cases was determined by running a Lexis search with only the year as a
search term; the number of adverb cases was ascertained through the following West query: (advanced:
ATLEAST3(intentionally) ATLEAST3(knowingly) ATLEAST3(fraudulently) ATLEAST3(willfully)
ATLEAST3(maliciously) ATLEAST3(corruptly) ATLEAST3(knowingly) ATLEAST3(wantonly)
ATLEAST3(recklessly)) & ((modif! /30 intentionally knowingly fraudulently willfully maliciously cor-
ruptly knowingly wantonly recklessly) & ATLEAST2(modif!) & (modif! /35 word adverb words phrase
words phrases noun element elements term terms verb)) & DA(aft 12-31-[year] & bef 01-01-[year]).
M 0 t__ "It - X W) N all
00 X r- r- r- 0 110 \ c tn
C Cl 011 C\ all C 0 C 01 C
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TABLE 1: ADVERBIAL CASES RATES OF GROWTH, 1954-2013
Search 130 Search 131 Combined (S1+S2)
3 2
Actual [Predicted] Actual [Predicted] Actual [Predicted]
19541963 2 2 4
1964-1973 5 [4] 6 [4] 11 [8]
1974-1983 14 [8] 2 [8] 16 [16]
1984-1993 46 [16] 15 [16] 61 [32]
1994-2003 52 [32] 12 [32] 64 [64]
2004-2013 119 [64] 33 [64] 152 [128]
Adverbial disputes are not only common problems for judges, but they
are becoming increasingly so for the practitioner as well. An explanation
for this surge in cases would consider several factors. Perhaps most impor-
tant is the common appearance of overt adverbs within statutory language,
creating more opportunities for the interpretation of adverbs to become a
significant legal problem. For example, a Westlaw search of the 1990
United States Code returns 763 occurrences of statutes using the adverb
"knowingly," and 114 returns for the adverb "intentionally." Within the
2014 edition, however, these words appear in statutes 1,065 and 222 times
respectively. A similar increase for these terms can be found in the Code
of Federal Regulations. A search of the 1984 edition returns "knowingly"
755 times and "intentionally" 211 times in regulations; by 2013 those que-
ries return 1,413 and 460 hits respectively. Increased use of adverbs within
statutes and regulations raises the likelihood that this language will become
the focus of a legal dispute landing in the courts.
The increase in the use of adverbs is confirmed by searching the texts
actually being litigated and tracking the passage dates. Of the 255 federal
cases identified as involving meaningful construal of the adverb "know-
ingly,"33 the majority of these cases (133) concerned statutes passed since
30. advanced: (ATLEAST3(intentionally) ATLEAST3(knowingly) ATLEAST3(fraudulently)
ATLEAST3(willfully) ATLEAST3(maliciously) ATLEAST3(corruptly) ATLEAST3(knowingly)
ATLEAST3(wantonly) ATLEAST3(recklessly)) & ((modif! /30 intentionally knowingly fraudulently
willfully maliciously corruptly knowingly wantonly recklessly) & ATLEAST2(modif!) & (modif! /35
word adverb words phrase words phrases noun element elements term terms verb)) & DA(aft 12-31-
[year] & bef 01-01-[year])
31. advanced: ATLEAST3(cruelly) ATLEAST3(deliberately) ATLEAST3(unlawfully)
ATLEAST3(wrongfully) ATLEAST3(negligently) ATLEAST3(carelessly) ATLEAST3(purposefully)
& ((modif! /30 (cruelly deliberately unlawfully wrongfully adequately negligently carelessly purpose-
fully) & ATLEAST2(modif!) & (modif! /35 (word adverb words phrase words phrases noun element
elements term terms verb)) & DA(aft 12-31-[year] & bef 01-01-[year]).
32. The limits on character strings within WestlawNext required that the search be divided into
two different queries.
33. The West search ("adverb and knowingly") identified a total of 273 cases; some were dis-
carded as being false hits with no direct relevance to the present inquiry. This result set is nonexhaus-
tive; decisions identified by other means - see, e.g., United States v. Yermian, 468 U.S. 63 (1984) - are
not captured because, despite dealing with the issue of the scope of the adverb "knowingly," those
decisions failed to actually use the word adverb.
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1970.14 In other words, more cases involving this prototypical mens rea
adverb involve statutes from the last forty years than from the earlier years
of 1829-1968 combined.
This empirical pattern fits well with the historical trends arguably un-
derlying the trend toward increased adjudication of grammar generally,
and of adverbs particularly. Although the common law is adverse to strict
criminal liability owing to its due process commitments, beginning in the
twentieth century courts started to favor strict liability." This direction
was later changed in 1970 when, with the passage of the Uniform Con-
trolled Substances Act,
the Commissioners altered their statute, and provided that
it is "unlawful for anyone person knowingly or intentionally
to possess a controlled substance," thus requiring knowl-
edge for the first time . . . The enactment of the Model
Penal Code [1962 and its subsequent interpretation to re-
strict, if not abolish, strict liability crimes, the growing
movement among courts in interpreting the common law to
require mens rea, and the Commonwealth experience in
permitting mistake of fact to act as a defense all reflect a
movement towards rejection of strict criminal liability.36
The increased preference of mens rea requirements arose concurrently
with the patterns described in the earlier analyses: increased statutory ad-
verbs in the early 1970s, culminating in more frequent statutory construc-
tion cases on reading adverbs in the 1980s and beyond. The creation of
new crimes, with new scienter elements, has led to increasingly more fre-
quent need for courts to read the language, as happened in Flores-Figue-
roa. We can predict that this pattern will continue.37
34. This evaluation considered only the enactment date of the core statute, and did not review
whether later amendments were at issue. This approach cuts against the hypothesis, rating possibly
more recent enactments as older. The conclusions reported, while supporting the predictions, reflect the
minimum distribution. The actual preference for recent law to provoke judicial scrutiny of adverbs may
be even more pronounced.
35. Richard G. Singer, The Resurgence of Mens Rea: Ill-The Rise and Fall of Strict Criminal
Liability, 30 B. C. L. RiwV. 337, 388 (1989), available at http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein
.journals/bclr30&id=343.
36. Id.
37. An unintended outcome of this ongoing process, however, has been the apparent emergence
of regional legal dialects as similar statutory language is read differently according to local preferences
concerning the rules of grammar. While it is fairly common for the substantive contents of legal terms
to vary (e.g., what constitutes "incest" varies by jurisdiction), for the rule to vary according to diverging
grammar is a new development.
An example of this process is the post- Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646 (2009) case
Hunter v. Miller-Stout, No. C12-5517 RBL/KLS, 2013 WL 1964928 (W.D. Wash. May 10, 2013) which
centered on the proper way to read the following Washington statute RCW 9.35.020(1): "he knowingly
obtains, possesses, uses, or transfers a means of identification or financial information of another per-
son, living or dead ..... This language parallels that at issue in Flores-Figueroa: the offender "know-
ingly transfers, possesses, or uses without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person."
18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1).
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IV. THE LAW'S UNIQUE RELATIONSHIP TO THE ADVERB
The increased use of adverbs within legal rules, leading more fre-
quently to the need to litigate their meanings, may be read by critics as
further demonstration of the pernicious effects of adverbs. However, this
abundance of problematic legal adverbs should not be attributed entirely
to the poor compositional choices of legislators.38 But for the adverbs, law
would be only a catalog of authoritatively enforced rules, i.e., an exercise in
political power, rather than law - a social order that consenting citizens
have a duty to obey. The distinction hinges on whether compliance should
be grounded in a fear of punishment for violation or a choice arising from
an understanding that the law is, in some ethically relevant sense, proper.
If we grant that the latter is the preferred basis for modern legal systems,39
statutes could not escape an abundance of textual adverbs even if elector-
ates sent only Stephen Kings to statehouses and Congress.
This point was made more formally by Shirley Letwin when she en-
dorsed the essential nature of legal rules as "adverbial":
Instead of commanding the subject to perform anything, a
rule designates the manner in which certain activities are to
be carried out by those who wish to engage in them or a
Although ostensibly decided using ordinary rules of grammar, Flores-Figueroa is rejected by the
state court: "Flores-Figueroa's statutory interpretation approach is inconsistent with Washington law.
The word 'knowingly' is an adverb, and, as a grammatical matter, an adverb generally modifies the verb
or verb phrase with which it is associated. Washington's identity theft statute states that, '[n]o person
may knowingly obtain, possess, use, or transfer a means of identification or financial information of
another person, living or dead, with the intent to commit, or to aid or abet, any crime.' Under this
state's statutory interpretation rules, 'knowingly' modifies the verb phrase-'obtain, possess, use, or
transfer.' Our courts have construed 'another person' to require proof that the identification or finan-
cial information belonged to a 'real person.' But 'knowingly' does not modify the phrase 'of another
person.' The phrase 'of another person' is an object and is not modified by the adverb knowingly."
Hunter, No. C12-5517 RBL/KLS, 2013 WL 1966168 at *5 (internal citations omitted).
At this early phase it is not possible to predict the practical outcome of the appearance of legal
dialects defined by different rules of grammar. However, argument can be made that it undermines the
ideal of legal publicity under which the ordinary person should be able to read the law and know what
behaviors are punishable by the state.
38. Although there is certainly enough of that to go around. Cf. Traps, supra note 28, at 664
("Sloppy drafting of criminal laws by Congress is a scourge that likely will persist in the future.").
39. See, e.g., TOM R. TYL ER, WIY PEOI'LE OnEY TilE LAW 178 (1990) ("People obey the law
because they believe that it is proper to do so, they react to their experiences by evaluating their justice
or injustice, and in evaluating the justice of their experiences they consider factors unrelated to out-
come, such as whether they have had a chance to state their case and have been treated with dignity
and respect .... This image differs strikingly from that of the self-interest models which dominate
current thinking in law, psychology, political science, sociology, and organizational theory, and which
need to be expanded.); contra FREIERICK SCIIAUER, TiE- FORCE Oi LAW (2015). Frederick Schauer
argues that rather than law striving toward an internalization of norms, law is primarily about coercion
and sanction, threatening bad consequences for behavioral noncompliance: "the claim that there is
widespread following of the law just because it is the law may well be false .... [The] pervasiveness of
force and the threat of it may be what makes law distinctive." Id. at x, 7. The challenge for Schauer's
thesis will be that sanction, at least when viewed cross-culturally, does not uniquely characterize law.
Invoking that definitional strategy reduces "law" to a generic synonym for any norm of social regula-
tion, indistinguishable from similar categories such as religion and custom, all of which also impose
sanctions on violators. See generally JAMES M. DONOVAN, LEGAl ANTIIROiPoLoGY: AN INrRODucriON
(2008).
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manner of punishing certain actions that are forbidden. A
law against murder does not command anyone to refrain
from killing, nor does it prohibit all killing. It stipulates that
whoever causes the death of another person in a certain
manner under certain conditions will be guilty of the crime
of murder. It prohibits causing death "murderously." Thus,
at the heart of the idea of law is a sharp distinction between
an obligation to subscribe to certain conditions in doing
what we choose and an obligation to perform this or that
action at a given time and place.4 °
In these comments, Letwin renders accessible the political philosophy
of Michael Oakeshott. His thinking is complex but reduces to the follow-
ing points: The rule of law is a "moral practice ... analogous to [the rules
of] a game."'" A practice, in its turn, "consists of well-defined conditions
that shape how people engage in a particular activity" and directs how
things are properly done without specifying any particular outcome. The
analogy here is with language. Speakers follow the rules for proper lan-
guage use in order to be understood, but the rules do not dictate that any
particular content be uttered. Similarly, within the boundaries determined
by the rules of practice, one remains free to choose one's actions:
What makes the idea of a practice so important is that it
unifies those engaged in it without dictating what anyone
does. This is because the requirements of a practice, being
conditions rather than commands or orders, are not obeyed
or disobeyed, but subscribed to. Structured this way, indi-
viduals remain free to choose what they will do.42
As Oakeshott explains,
the expression 'the rule of law,' taken precisely, stands for a
mode of moral association exclusively in terms of the recog-
nition of the authority of known, non-instrumental rules
(that is, laws) which impose obligations to subscribe to ad-
verbial conditions in the performance of the self-chosen ac-
tions of all who fall within their jurisdiction.
4 3
In other words, "[a] rule [like law] can never tell a performer what choice
he shall make; it announces only conditions to be subscribed to in making
choices."44 Any appearance that a legal rule prohibits an act is illusory.
Despite surface grammar to the contrary, in practice, as Letwin echoed,
40. SIIIRLEiY ROBIN LETWIN, ON TIlE His jORY 01 THE IDEA Oi LAW 334-35 (2005).
41. Id. at 313.
42. Id. at 310.
43. MICIHAFL OAKESIIOIT, The Rule of Law, in ON HISTORY AND OTlIER ESSAYS 136 (1983).
44. MICIIAEL OAKESIIOTF, ON HUMAN CONEHUCr 58 (1991).
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"[a] criminal law does not forbid killing or lighting a fire, it forbids killing
'murderously' or lighting a fire 'arsonically'. ''4 5 Instead, the law states the
penalties of choosing one course over the other. Aware of possible penal-
ties, the actor remains free to choose.
This description differs from the popular reading that a law states what
one must not do, upon penalty. Compliance with such a rule may yield
results indistinguishable to the outside observer from the interior focus of-
fered by Oakeshott. In both instances few persons are murdered. But the
two approaches presuppose radically different relationships between the
actor and the state. In the common reading of the statute prohibiting
homicide, we refrain from murdering out of fear of the consequences rang-
ing from imprisonment to death. Oakeshott, however, envisions a legal or-
der grounded not on fear, but on free choice: choosing not to murder
because it signals an act as incomprehensible to the rule of law as double
negatives are to rules of grammar, or kicking the ball in the game of bas-
ketball. One can do any of those things, but they cannot be done while
intending to observe the rules of the relevant practice.
This way of viewing legal order represents Oakeshott's attempt to ex-
plain why people have a duty to obey the law.4 6 He works within the tradi-
tion that such a duty arises only after the individual has given consent. This
conviction provided the basis, for example, on which Thomas Jefferson be-
lieved that a constitution should expire after nineteen years.4 7 As Jefferson
observed, none of us today have consented to be bound by the United
States Constitution, and most of us have not given actual consent to the
laws under which we live. If legal legitimacy flows from consent, as indeed
Jefferson wrote in the Declaration of Independence,48 these facts would im-
ply that we have no obligation to obey laws that we have inherited. That
conclusion, however, leads to anarchy. No one could be held to any obliga-
tions to which they had not specifically and personally already agreed.
Oakeshott was concerned to preserve the premise that the rule of law
was built upon the Lockean "consent of the governed[,]" 49 while avoiding
Jefferson's impractical result that constitutions expired or that individuals
45. Id. at n. 1.
46. The present author accepts that such a duty exists, although this is not a point universally
conceded. A review of the most prominent justifications for such a duty is offered at William A. Ed-
mundson, State of the Art: The Duty to Obey the Law, 10 LEGAl TinzojRy 215 (2004).
47. Thomas Jefferson, Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, Paris September 6, 1789, in TIlE PA-
PlERS OF TiIOMAS JI'-1-1FRSON 395-396 (Julian Boyd, ed. 1958) ("[No] society can make a perpetual
constitution, or even a perpetual law. The earth belongs always to the living generation. They may
manage it then, and what proceeds from it, as they please, during their usufruct. They are masters too
of their own persons, and consequently may govern them as they please. But persons and property
make the sum of the objects of government. The constitution and the laws of their predecessors extin-
guished then in their natural course with those who gave them being. This could preserve that being till
it ceased to be itself, and no longer. Every constitution then, and every law, naturally expires at the end
of 19 years. If it be enforced longer, it is an act of force, and not of right.").
48. TiIE DECLARATION OF INDIEPENDENCIE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) ("Governments are instituted
among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.").
49. See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 192 (1662) ("For no govern-
ment can have a right to obedience from a people who have not freely consented to it.").
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could opt out of disagreeable rules because they had not previously sig-
naled their agreement. The answer, he suggests, lies in the fact that law
directs a manner of being rather than slavish conformity with specific acts.
We remain free to choose, constrained only to make our choices within the
bounds of the moral rules of our civic association, and the willingness to
pay the costs for venturing beyond. To return to the language analogy, law
establishes the grammar and syntax of social living, tools by which citizens
are able to choose how to construct their own lives. So long as their
choices remain comprehensible and reasonable to their fellows, they can be
described as "following the law," and by so behaving, they signal their con-
sent to be bound even by laws that were enacted centuries earlier.
By design, Oakeshott's analysis characterizes the deep background of
legal institutions as adverbial. Frequently this disposition irrupts into our
awareness through the appearance of the ordinary adverbs in legal rules.
These literal adverbs permit the moral dimension of the normative social
order to become manifest at appropriate moments. Adverbs direct our at-
tention away from external behavioral conformity and toward the con-
senting wills of the actors, and thus to their free choices.
Adverbs have this impact because they pertain to the criterion of mens
rea. Mens rea in legal terminology refers to the required "guilty mind"
when performing a criminally prohibited act. The defendant must not only
have acted wrongly, but also have known that the act was wrong.50 In the
case described earlier,5 even though Flores-Figueroa could be convicted
for presenting identification that may have belonged to another person, he
could be guilty of aggravated identity theft only if he knew that the identifi-
cation in fact belonged to another person.
Many of the adverbs commonly appearing in law bear an obvious rela-
tionship to the states of mind of the actor. Instances discussed by the
courts include: maliciously,52  knowingly,53  intentionally,54  unduly,5
wilfully,56 and deceitfully.57 The goal of the present discussion, however, is
not a simple reminder of the recurring function of adverbs to demarcate
50. See, e.g., Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 252 (1952) (defining "'mens rea,' [as] to
signify an evil purpose or mental culpability"); People v. Digirolamo, 664 N.E.2d 720, 723 (111. App.
1996) ("The law requires that serious criminal conduct be accompanied by mens rea, knowledge of
guilt.").
51. Flores-Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646 (2009); see also supra text accompanying notes
16-28.
52. Daeche v. United States, 250 F. 566, 570 (2d Cir. 1918).
53. United States v. Jae Shim, 584 F.3d 394, 395 (2d Cir. 2009). Michael Moore argues that, in
the context of the decision over grammar in United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., that "'knowingly'
never functions like true adverb." Michael S. Moore, Plain Meaning and Linguistics-A Case Study, 73
WASH. UNiv. L.Q. 1253, 1257 (1995). For present purposes, this observation serves simply to remind us
that despite their mere appearance which has served to generate sweeping style guidelines on their use,
adverbs are semantically complex.
54. Deur v. Sheriff of the Cnty. of Newaygo, 362 N.W.2d 698, 701 (Mich. 1984) ("The rules of
grammar and common usage would require the adverb "intentionally" to modify the word or phrase it
precedes and not the word of phrase that comes before it.").
55. Baltimore & O.R. Co. v. United States, 22 F. Supp. 533, 538 (N.D.N.Y. 1937).
56. Bryan v. United States, 524 U.S. 184, 191 (1998).
57. United States v. Brown, 5 F. Supp. 81, 84 (S.D.N.Y. 1933).
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the psychological postures of actors. The broader argument suggests that
adverbs offer a privileged window into the legally crucial inquiry of motiva-
tion and intent. Mens rea terms are "usually expressed as adverbs."58 The
tight relationship between adverbs and intentionality can lead courts to
read mens rea requirements differently depending on whether the underly-
ing ideas have been framed in terms other than adverbs.
United States v. Roberts concerned a trade secrets action in which the
defendant argued that the Economic Espionage Act was unconstitutionally
vague as applied.59 The statutory language states that
whoever, with intent to convert a trade secret, that is related
to or included in a product that is produced for or placed in
interstate or foreign commerce, to the economic benefit of
anyone other than the owner thereof, and intending or
knowing that the offense will, injure any owner of that trade
secret .... 60
The principle question for the court was whether this language re-
quired that the defendant have actual knowledge that the device in contro-
versy was a trade secret.61 The defendants argued in the affirmative, citing
Flores-Figueroa as support for their position that "the mental state 'intent'
in the first clause of subsection (a) modifies both "convert" and "trade se-
cret" and that the language "intending or knowing," which occurs later in
the subsection, modifies the subsequent term "trade secret."6 The defend-
ants' reading would presumably require that the defendant know that the
article at issue was a trade secret.
The court rejected this argument for reasons of special relevance to
this discussion.
The present Court finds it hard to apply the holding from
Flores-Figueroa to the portions of the EEA that the defend-
ants cite because the mens rea terms the defendants point
out are not adverbs. "Intent" in the first clause of subsec-
tion (a) is a noun, and "intending or knowing" are verbs.63
The court instead held that although the statute does require that the
defendant have knowledge that the item is proprietary, that knowledge
need not rise to the level of whether "the trade secret in question actually
58. Darryl K. Brown, Federal Mens Rea Interpretation and the Limits of Culpability's Relevance,
75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 116 (2012).
59. United States v. Roberts, No. 3:08-CR-175, 2009 WL 5449224, at *1-3 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 17,
2009) report and recommendation adopted, No. 3:08-CR-175, 2010 WL 56085 (E.D. Tenn. Jan. 5, 2010)
affd sub nom. United States v. Howley, 707 F.3d 575 (6th Cir. 2013).
60. 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a)
61. Roberts, No. 3:08-CR-175, 2009 WL 5449224, at *3.
62. Id. at *9.
63. Id. at *10.
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meets the statutory definition."'  The stated rationale for this result,
though, raises the possibility that the outcome might have been more
favorable to Roberts if the statute had been written with adverbs.
65
As Letwin noted, the adverbial emphasis of the legal system can be
distinguished from the strict liability rules that Flores-Figueroa wished to
avoid, and from ordinary compelled orders such as the requirement to pay
income taxes. While these latter directives are also rules, they are of a
different type that is more difficult to reconcile with the consent of the
government thesis. Instead of generating a duty to obey from consent and
choice, they instead base their compliance upon fear and sanction. Strict
liability and similar rules thus may not rise to the level of true laws in
Oakeshott's jurisprudential sense.66 Such rules assign responsibility and
maintain order by treating human actors akin to natural phenomena, social
analogues to cattle or hurricanes, and not as rational thinking, and ulti-
mately consenting, citizens.
The overarching question Oakeshott hoped to resolve asked "how
people can engage in orderly activities, where they recognize and accept
common standards, without being reduced to uniformity or having re-
course to an infallible or non-human source of truth."67 Adverbs shift the
legal liability inquiry from the naked act to the intending person. Without
adverbs, law can be efficient, but it will not be moral, nor would we have an
ethical duty to obey (at least if one believes that the consent of the gov-
erned is required for the legitimacy of a legal regime). Were we to remove
adverbs, as Stephen King recommends, we would move beyond the perim-
eter of the rule of law and into the exercise of mere power.68
64. Id. at *21.
65. See, e.g., id. at *7 ("Whoever acts to intentionally convert a trade secret, that is related to or
included in a product that is produced for or placed in interstate or foreign commerce, to the economic
benefit of anyone other than the owner thereof, and intentionally or knowingly that the offense will,
injure any owner of that trade secret .... ") (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a)). Decisions arguing the
opposite - that adverbs bear no special relationship to mens rea evaluations -also exist. See, e.g.,
United States v. Reynoso, 239 F.3d 143, 147-148 (2d Cir. 2000) ("Reynoso and our dissenting colleague
emphasize that the statutory language is 'truthfully provided' rather than 'truthful information,' and
would have us infer from Congress's use of an adverb that 'the emphasis in the statute is on the defen-
dant's state of mind,' but we are unpersuaded. In previous cases concerning § 3553(f)(5), we have,
except when quoting the statute itself, almost without fail used the adjective 'truthful' when articulating
the standard to be applied. This consistent usage, considered in conjunction with both the dictionary
definitions of the term 'truthful' quoted above and the ordinary, common-sense meaning of the word
leads ineluctably to the conclusion that Congress intended no legal significance to attach to its use of
the words 'truthfully provided' rather than 'truthful information."') (internal citations omitted).
66. One possible escape from the suggestion that citizens bear no duty to pay income taxes, or
the equally awkward conclusion that such rules fail to rise to the status of true laws, relates to the
frequency with which such rules are amended. Contemporary changes to the tax code signal an under-
lying consent to the tax code in general. So long as such changes are made at least once every nineteen
years, then Jefferson's argument for expiration is evaded. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
67. LETWIN, supra note 40, at 310.
68. We can envision a possible comparative analysis of the development of the idea of the rea-
soning individual supporting the belief that political legitimacy is grounded in the consent of the gov-
erned, with the varying uses of adverbs in legal texts. Following Oakeshott, the prediction would be
that these variables vary directly, so that an increase in the presence of the latter signals a growing
acceptance of the former.
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V. FINAL THOUGHTS
Despite the low reputation of adverbs, their use within legal rules con-
tinues to grow. While legal writers should be cautioned against superfluous
use of adverbs, the reasons for such frugality contrasts with that offered to
writers of other disciplines. In law, adverbs should be used sparingly, but
not because they are weak and frivolous. Instead, in law, adverbs are in-
tense and powerful. What a page of words gives or denies, a single adverb
can reverse in practical effect.6 9 An attorney's eyes should not be trained
to skip lightly over a statute's qualifying adverb, but rather to highlight it as
vital as any other word to its meaning, and perhaps more than most. Ad-
verbs should be respected, even a bit feared, but not hated, and certainly
never underestimated.
Messages that disparage the importance of adverbs risk training law-
yers not merely to misread the technical operation of the law, but, and
more damningly to society, encourage them to overlook the moral heart of
law itself. Law works to organize the actions of willful citizens while re-
specting their status as intending persons. To instill the traditional aversion
to adverbs upsets this balance between order and freedom. Lawyers must
not become obsessed with the dissection of mere rules and grow blind to
the people living their choices within the boundaries of those rules. Freely.
69. White v. E. Side Mill & Lumber Co., 158 P. 527 (Or. 1916) ("A very short word may change
the whole meaning of a sentence. Eliminate the little adverb "not" from the Ten Commandments and
there remains an injunction to commit the very offenses there prohibited.").
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I. INTRODUCTION
In March 2010, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act -
more commonly known as Obamacare - was passed by Congress and
signed into law by President Barack Obama.' Apart from being incredibly
lengthy and complicated, this near one-thousand-page piece of legislation
has been the "biggest overhaul of the $2.6 trillion healthcare system since
the 1960s. ''2 Designed to provide every American with an opportunity to
receive affordable healthcare, Obamacare's most important component is
its minimum coverage requirement, also known as the "individual man-
date."3 "The individual mandate is a requirement that all individuals who
can afford health-care insurance purchase some minimally comprehensive
policy."' The alternative to complying with the individual mandate, how-
ever, is the "shared responsibility payment,"5 a "penalty" imposed on the
taxpayer for failing to comply with the statutory obligations of the individ-
ual mandate. Because this legislation would essentially give the federal
government "the right to force individuals to involuntarily take part in
commerce,"6 which nearly seventy percent of the American people op-
posed,' several lawsuits were filed immediately after Obamacare's enact-
ment challenging its constitutionality.
After the lower courts made their respective decisions, the Supreme
Court of the United States granted a writ of certiorari to hear the final case
- National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (hereinafter
"NFIB").8 In arguing for the bill's constitutionality, the government as-
serted that the power to pass such legislation stemmed from several consti-
tutional powers.9 First, the government argued that the individual mandate
was "a valid exercise of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause and
the Necessary and Proper Clause."'" The government then argued in the
alternative to say that even if the Commerce Clause and Necessary and
1. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Robert Pear, Obama Signs Health Care Overhaul Bill, With a
Flourish, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2010, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/24/health/policy/
24health.html?_r=0.
2. James Vicini & Jonathan Stempel, US Top Court Upholds Healthcare Law in Obama Tri-
umph, REUTERS, June 28, 2012, available at http://www.reuters.comlarticle/2012/06/28/usa-healthcare-
court-idUSL2E8HS4WG20120628.
3. See Ezra Klein, The Importance of the Individual Mandate, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 2009, avail-
able at http://voices.washingtonpost.com/ezra-kleinJ2009/12/draftl.html.
4. Ezra Klein, How Does the Individual Mandate Work, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 2010, available at
http://voices.washingtonpost.comezra-klein/2OlOO31how does the-individualmandat.html.
5. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(b) (2010).
6. Dustin Hawkins, The Conservative Challenge to Obamacare, http://usconservatives.about
.com/od/economytaxes/alThe-Conservative-Challenge-To-Obamacare.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2013).
7. See 69% Say Federal Government Lacks Authority to Force Purchase of Health Insurance,
RASMUSSEN REPORTS (Nov. 17, 2011), http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public-content/politics/cur
rentevents/healthcare/november_2011/69_sayjfederalgovernment lacks.authority-to-force-pur
chase_of_healthinsurance.
8. See Avik Roy, Finally, Supreme Court Agrees to Hear Obamacare Challenges, FORBES, Jan.
14, 2011, available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/aroy/2011/11/14/finally-supreme-court-agrees-to-hear-
obamacare-challenges/.
9. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
10. Id. at 2585.
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Proper Clause did not authorize Congress's power to do this, the taxing
power did.1
Months following the government's "train wreck" performance during
oral argument,' 2 the Court issued its decision on June 28, 2012."3 It is safe
to say, however, that both political and legal scholars were stunned by the
Court's ruling.14 Writing for the prevailing opinion,"5 Chief Justice John
Roberts held that while the individual mandate could not be sustained
under the Commerce Clause, Obamacare's shared responsibility payment
could "reasonably be characterized as a tax."' 6 While dismissing the gov-
ernment's other arguments regarding the Commerce Clause and Necessary
and Proper Clause, Chief Justice Roberts ruled that the shared responsibil-
ity payment was not a penalty, even though Congress had labeled it as one
throughout the legislative process.'7 Articulating a four-factor criteria,
Chief Justice Roberts stated that the shared responsibility payment was a
tax and therefore clearly constitutional under Congress's taxing power. 8
The Constitution of the United States contains only four types of
taxes: duties, excises, direct taxes, and the income tax.' 9 Because there are
only four types of federal taxes authorized by the Constitution, it is neces-
sary that every tax imposed by the federal government be within the scope
of one of these. In his prevailing opinion, Chief Justice Roberts gives a
short analysis and then swiftly concludes that the shared responsibility pay-
ment is a tax "triggered by specific circumstances"2 without giving any
indication as to which of the four types of permitted taxes it is.
Part II of this Note discusses a background of the individual mandate
and the judicial decisions that eventually climaxed and concluded in NFIB.
Part III analyzes the four types of taxes in the Constitution. Part IV is an
application to decipher if and how the Obamacare shared responsibility
payment tax falls within the scope of any of the four types of permitted
taxes. Part V provides an outline for the next step to challenge the consti-
tutionality of the shared responsibility payment. In essence, this Note will
answer a seemingly unasked and unanswered question: What kind of tax is
Obamacare?
11. Id. at 2593.
12. Byron Tau, Toobin: Health Law 'Looks Like It's Going to Be Struck Down,' POLITICO, Mar.
27, 2012, available at http://www.politico.com/politico44/2012/03/toobin-health-law-looks-ike-its-going-
to-be-struck-118811.html.
13. See Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2566.
14. Mark Hall, Legal Experts Were Completely Stunned by John Roberts' Healthcare Opinion,
BUSINESS INSIDER, June 29, 2012, available at http://www.businessinsider.com/mark-hall-legal-expert-
john-roberts-affordable-health-care-supreme-court-ruling-2012-6.
15. The term "prevailing opinion" is used instead of "majority opinion" throughout this Note
because while some parts of the opinion are on behalf of a majority, others are plurality, and some are
where the Chief Justice is writing solely on his behalf.
16. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2591, 2600.
17. Id. at 2595.
18. Id. at 2595-2600.
19. See generally U.S. CONST.
20. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2599.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. The Individual Mandate & The Shared Responsibility Payment
The individual mandate contained within Obamacare is nothing new
to the American healthcare system, having first been proposed "in 1993 as
part of the Health Security Act, the national health reform legislation pro-
posed by then-President Bill Clinton. '21 With the individual mandate hav-
ing been a hot topic in the political arena, several key arguments for its
enactment developed.22 The first was that it would be "key to having
America's hybrid public-private system of health coverage function as ef-
fectively as possible . . . because the risk of high medical expenses for a
relative few is spread among a large and diverse group of healthy peo-
ple."'23 Another argument was that the individual mandate would help
combat against "free-riding," which occurs when the costs of an uninsured
person are passed on to the insured population "in the form of higher
charges, which in turn lead to higher premiums. '' 24 Finally, it was argued
that the individual mandate would eliminate adverse selection, the propen-
sity "of those with higher risk to purchase insurance in greater amount than
those with lower risk."'25 Because almost all Americans, both healthy and
unhealthy, would be required to obtain health insurance, adverse selection
would essentially dissolve.26
Finding these arguments persuasive and then campaigning before the
American people on a platform that such benefits would be realized, the
Democrat-controlled One Hundred and Eleventh United States Congress
included an individual mandate in Obamacare. 7 Unlike many parts of the
healthcare legislation, the individual mandate is starkly simple. The section
provides the following: "An applicable individual shall for each month be-
ginning after 2013 ensure that the individual, and any dependent of the
individual who is an applicable individual, is covered under minimum es-
sential [healthcare] coverage for such month.
28
Recognizing, however, that not all Americans would comply with the
individual mandate, Congress included the shared responsibility payment
in the legislation as a method to encourage adherence with Obamacare.29
Therefore, Obamacare states that an applicable individual who "fails to
21. Individual Mandate: Congress is Now Weighing Different Version of a Requirement that Indi-
viduals Obtain Health Insurance, HEALTH AFFAIRS, 1 (Jan. 13, 2010), http://www.healthaffairs.org/
healthpolicybriefs/brieLpdfs/healthpolicybrief_14.pdf [hereinafter Individual Mandate].
22. Id. at 4.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id; Seth J. Chandler, Adverse Selection, WOLFRAM DEMONSTRATIONS PROJECT, http://demon
strations.wolfram.com/AdverseSelection/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2013).
26. Individual Mandate, supra note 21, at 4.
27. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (2014).
28. § 5000A(a).
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meet the requirement .. .for 1 or more months, then, except as pro-
vided[,] . . .is hereby imposed on the taxpayer a penalty with respect to
such failures in the amount determined [by the statute].
'30
This payment imposed on individuals, described in the Obamacare
text as a penalty, "would start at $95, or up to 1 percent of income, which-
ever is greater, and rise to $695, or 2.5 percent of income, by 2016. "31 This
penalty also applies to employers with "at least 50 full-time employees or a
combination of full-time and part-time employees that equals at least 50.
"132
According to the Internal Revenue Service,
If an applicable large employer does not offer coverage or
offers coverage to fewer than 95 % of its full-time employees
(and their dependants), it owes an Employer Shared Re-
sponsibility payment equal to the number of full-time em-
ployees the employer employed for the year (minus up to
30) multiplied by $2,000, as long as at least one full-time
employee receives the premium tax credit.33
Included in the statute to essentially force taxpayers to purchase
health insurance, the individual mandate and shared responsibility pay-
ment were what prompted the constitutional challenges to Obamacare.
B. Obamacare Challenged - Lawsuits Commence
Even months before Obamacare was signed into law, "[o]rganizations
and lawmakers [who were] opposed to [it were] getting their legal briefs in
a bunch, threatening to challenge the constitutionality of the sweeping
overhaul . . . . ,3 While the state of Florida filed suit to challenge the
legislation's constitutionality only minutes after its passage,35 eventually a
total of twenty-eight states and several business organizations would simi-
larly sue.36 While many of the state lawsuits dealt with the cut in Medicaid
funding for failure to comply with the law, the main issue brought before
30. § 5000A(b)(1).
31. Phil Galewitz, Consumers Guide to Health Reform, KAIZER HEALTH NEWS, Apr. 13, 2010,
http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Stories/2010/March/22/consumers-guide-health-reform.aspx.
32. I.R.S., Questions and Answers on Employer Shared Responsibility Provisions Under the Af-
fordable Care Act, http://www.irs.gov/uac/Newsroom/Questions-and-Answers-on-Employer-Shared-Re
sponsibility-Provisions-Under-the-Affordable-Care-Act (last updated May 13, 2014).
33. Id.
34. Health Care Bill Could Face String of Legal Challenges, Fox NEWS, Dec. 29, 2009, available
at http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/12/22/health-care-face-string-legal-chaenges/.
35. See Fla. ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256 (N.D.
Fla. 2011), affd in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Fla. ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human
Servs., 648 F.3d 1235 (11th Cir. 2011), cert. granted sub nom. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132
S. Ct. 603 (2011), affd in part, rev'd in part, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012)).
36. See Deroy Murdock, 28 States Suing Over Obamcare, NEWSMAX, Feb. 18, 2011, available at
http://www.newsmax.com/Murdock/healthcare-obamacare/2011/02/18/id/386576/.
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the courts was whether the individual mandate was within the Constitu-
tion's grant of power to Congress.37
Inasmuch as the state of Florida was the first to file suit, the case of
Florida ex rel. Bondi v. United States Department of Health and Human
Services received a great deal of attention after the first court to hear the
case released its opinion in late January 2011.38 Both proponents and op-
ponents of the law believed that the avenue for the individual mandate's
victory or defeat would come through the Commerce Clause, and as pre-
dicted, Judge Roger Vinson of the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Florida spent much of his discussion on that ques-
tion.39 In his holding, Judge Vinson concluded that the individual mandate
was not within the scope of congressional power by means of the Com-
merce Clause:
To now hold that Congress may regulate the so-called "eco-
nomic decision" to not purchase a product or service in an-
ticipation of future consumption is a "bridge too far." It is
without logical limitation and far exceeds the existing legal
boundaries established by Supreme Court precedent. Be-
cause I find both the "uniqueness" and "economic decision"
arguments unpersuasive, I conclude that the individual man-
date seeks to regulate economic inactivity, which is the very
opposite of economic activity. And because activity is re-
quired under the Commerce Clause, the individual mandate
exceeds Congress' commerce power, as it is understood, de-
fined, and applied in the existing Supreme Court case law.4"
Perhaps the most note-worthy point in Judge Vinson's opinion, how-
ever, was a footnote in the beginning of his sixty-three page opinion:
I previously rejected the defendants' argument that this
penalty was really a tax .... My earlier ruling on the de-
fendants' tax argument is incorporated into this order and,
significantly, has the effect of focusing the issue of the indi-
vidual mandate on whether it is authorized by the Com-
merce Clause. To date, every court to consider this issue
37. See National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, SCOTUSBLoG, http://www
.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/national-federation-of-independent-business-v-sebeius/ (last visited
Jan. 21, 2015).
38. See Bondi, 780 F. Supp. 2d at 1263; see also Tom Brown, Judge Strikes Down Healthcare
Reform Law, REUTERS, Jan. 31, 2011, available at http://www.reuters.comlarticle/2011/01/31/us-usa-
healthcare-ruling-idUSTRE70U6RY20110131; David Whelan, Florida Judge Rules Against Obama-
Care, Calls Individual Mandate Unconstitutional, FoRBEs, Jan. 31, 2011, available at http://www.forbes
.com/sites/davidwhelan/2011/01/31/breaking-news-florida-judge-rues-against-obamacare-individual-
mandate-unconstitutional/; see also Janet Adamy, Judge Rejects Health Law, WALL ST. J., Feb. 1, 2011,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703439504576116361022463224.html.
39. See Bondi, 780 F. Supp. 2d at 1273-95.
40. Id. at 1294-95 (emphasis added).
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(even those that have ruled in favor of the federal govern-
ment) have also rejected the tax . .. arguments.
41
With this statement it seemed that the argument that the shared responsi-
bility payment could be construed as a tax was a complete waste of time
with no chance of success. Nonetheless, the government pressed on.
Unsurprisingly, after Judge Vinson's decision, the government ap-
pealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.42
Once again, the bulk of the opinion's discussion focused on the Commerce
Clause, as forty-five pages of the majority's ninety-three page opinion were
dedicated to the topic.43 Conversely, only seven pages were devoted to the
government's tax argument.' Unfortunately for the government's posi-
tion, the three-judge panel for the Eleventh Circuit introduced the tax ar-
gument discussion with a less than embracing statement:
Like every other court that has addressed this claim, we re-
main unpersuaded. It is not surprising to us that all of the
federal courts, which have otherwise reached sharply diver-
gent conclusions on the constitutionality of the individual
mandate, have spoken on this issue with clarion uniformity.
Beginning with the district court in this case, all have found,
without exception, that the individual mandate operates as a
regulatory penalty, not a tax. For good reason. The breadth
of the taxing power, well noted by the government and its
amici, fails to resolve the question we face: whether the indi-
vidual mandate is a tax in the first place. The plain language
of the statute and well-settled principles of statutory con-
struction overwhelmingly establish that the individual man-
date is not a tax, but rather a penalty. The legislative
history of the Act further supports this conclusion.45
The Eleventh Circuit made the government's tax argument sound
hopeless from beginning to end, and it eventually rejected both of the gov-
ernment's positions regarding the Commerce Clause and the taxing
power.46 This would seemingly lead to the final battle in the Obamacare
legal war, as the decision was appealed to the Supreme Court of the United
States for what became a landmark decision of political controversy, socio-
economic impact, and legal consequence.
41. Id. at 1265 n. 4 (emphasis added).
42. See Fla. ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1235 (11th
Cir. 2011), cert. granted sub nom. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 603 (2011), affid in
part, rev'd in part, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012)); see also Steven Ertelt, Obama Admin Appeals Florida
Judge's Ruling Overturning Obarnacare, LrFE NEws, Apr. 4, 2011, http://www.lifenews.com/2011/04/04/
obama-admin-appeals-florida-judges-ruling-overturning-obamacare/.
43. See Fla. ex rel. Att'y Gen, 648 F.3d at 1268-1313.
44. Id. at 1313-20.
45. Id. at 1313-14 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
46. Id. at 1328.
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C. Argument Before the Supreme Court
On November 14, 2011, the Supreme Court of the United States
granted a writ of certiorari to hear the Obamacare challenges. 47 Because
six other lawsuits challenging Obamacare's constitutionality were scattered
throughout the American judicial system, the Court consolidated them into
one case: National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius.48 The
Court scheduled six hours of oral arguments for the case, which took place
on March 26-28, 2012.4' Day One of oral argument created quite a bit of
confusion as the government's overall argument would noticeably contra-
dict itself over the course of the three days. First, the government argued
that for purposes of the lawsuit not being barred by the Anti-Injunction
Act, Obamacare's shared responsibility payment was a penalty - not a
tax.50 The next day, however, when arguing that the individual mandate
was within the scope of Congressional power, the government made the
opposite argument: the shared responsibility payment is a tax and not a
penalty.5x Interestingly enough, the "[a]dministration lawyers devoted
only 21 lines of their reply brief to [the tax] argument and it barely came up
at oral arguments.
5 2
Several Justices pressed U.S. Solicitor General Donald Verrilli about
what exactly the government was trying to argue: "'General Verrilli, today
you are arguing that the penalty is not a tax. Tomorrow you are going to be
back and you will be arguing that the penalty is a tax,' said Justice Samuel
Alito .... ,53 Among the conservative-leaning justices, Chief Justice Rob-
erts "only asked a handful of questions and did not seem to indicate that he
believe[d] the mandate [was] a tax."' 54 While perception is in the eye of the
beholder, many pundits would find that they guessed wrong on what Chief
Justice Roberts was truly thinking.
D. Deciding That the Individual Mandate Is A Tax
On June 28, 2012, all of America's political focus centered on how the
Supreme Court would rule regarding the constitutionality of the individual
47. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 603, 603 (2011), affd in part, rev'd in part,
132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
48. See Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2566; see also Supreme Court To Hear Obama-
care Arguments This Week, EXAMINER (Mar. 27, 2012), http://www.examiner.com/article/supreme-
court-to-hear-obamacare-arguments-this-week.
49. Allocation of Oral Argument Time, Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 603, available at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/docket/PDFs/022112zor.pdf; see Elizabeth Slattery, Obamacare Set for
Oral Argument, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION (Dec. 19, 2011, 2:14 PM), http://blog.heritage.org/2011/
12/19/obamacare-set-for-oral-argumentl.
50. Sahil Kapur, Alito, Breyer Call Out Obama Lawyer for Dubbing Mandate Both a 'Penalty'
and 'Tax,' TALKING Poirrs MEMO (Mar. 26, 2012, 5:39 PM), http://talkingpointsmemo.com/dc/alito-
breyer-call-out-obama-lawyer-for-dubbing-mandate-both-a-penalty-and-tax.
51. Id.
52. The Robert Rules, WALL ST. J., July 2, 2012, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052702304058404577494400059173634.html (emphasis omitted) [hereinafter Robert Rules].
53. Kapur, supra note 50.
54. Id.
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mandate.5" The Chief Justice announced the decision and issued the pre-
vailing opinion from the fractured Court.56 The opinion's first point was
that the Commerce Power could not support the individual mandate.57
Given that the tax argument received so little attention, some news outlets
jumped to the conclusion that the government had lost the case. 58 The
Chief Justice made those who jumped to this conclusion pay a steep price
in embarrassment,59 however, as the prevailing opinion upheld the individ-
ual mandate through the means of the perpetually short-changed tax argu-
ment.6° What was most shocking was the method in which the Court
reached its final decision.61 With the Court concluding 5-4 that the Com-
merce Clause did not give Congress the power to compel individuals to
purchase health insurance,62 it seemed that there would be no avenue
through which the individual mandate could be upheld. After all, "[e]very
lower court that heard the health-care cases rejected the taxing argument,"
almost to the point of giving it no recognition.63 But apparently Chief Jus-
tice John Roberts saw something all of the other judges had not.
Beginning his discussion on the tax argument, Chief Justice Roberts
stated that the issue was "whether the Government's alternative reading of
the statute - that it only imposes a tax on those without insurance - is a
reasonable one."6 4 Chief Justice Roberts went on to say that even though
Congress called the shared responsibility payment a penalty and not a tax,
such a description would not necessarily determine its correct legal label.65
The Chief Justice then listed the three characteristics of a penalty: first, a
penalty imposes a heavy burden; second, a penalty requires scienter be-
cause it is designed to punish behavior; third, a penalty is not intent on
collecting revenue.66 Keeping this three-element analysis in mind, Chief
Justice Roberts differentiated the shared responsibility payment from a
penalty and held that it may be considered a tax:
55. See Doug McKelway, Supreme Court Expected to Roll Out ObamaCare Ruling Thursday,
Fox NEWS. June 25, 2012, available at http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2012/06/25/supreme-court-ex-
pected-to-roll-out-obamacare-ruling-thursday/; see also Obamacare Supreme Court Decision Sparks
Outpouring of Reaction, HUFFINGTON POST (Jun. 28, 2012, 4:24 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2012/06/28/obamacare-supreme-court-decision n 1585156.html#slide=1107842.
56. See Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2566 (2012).
57. Id. at 2572.
58. See Joe Coscarelli, CNN and Fox News Completely Bungle Health-Care Ruling, N.Y. MAG.,
Jun. 28, 2012, available at http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2012/06/cnn-fox-news-cable-news-bun-
gles-health-care-ruling.html.
59. Id.
60. See Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2566, 2600.
61. See Geoff Earle, High Court Upholds Obamacare in Surprise Ruling, THE N.Y. POST, Jun. 29,
2012, available at http://www.nypost.com/p/news/national/diagnosis-it-taxa6WKPXq9avhWRyr6DF4
WPM: see also NappNazworth, Supreme Court 'Obamacare' Decision Full of Irony, Surprise, CHRIS-
TIAN POST, Jun. 28, 2012, available at http://www.christianpost.com/news/supreme-court-obamacare-de
cision-full-of-irony-surprise-77385/.
62. See Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2593.
63. Robert Rules, supra note 52.
64. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus.,132 S. Ct. at 2593 (emphasis added).
65. Id. at 2595.
66. Id.
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[T]he shared responsibility payment may for constitutional
purposes be considered a tax, not a penalty: First, for most
Americans the amount due will be far less than the price of
insurance, and, by statute, it can never be more .... Second,
the individual mandate contains no scienter requirement.
Third, the payment is collected solely by the IRS through
the normal means of taxation-except that the Service is not
allowed to use those means most suggestive of a punitive
sanction, such as criminal prosecution .... Neither the Act
nor any other law attaches negative legal consequences to
not buying health insurance, beyond requiring a payment to
the IRS.67
In concluding his tax holding, Chief Justice Roberts stated that "[t]he
whole point of the shared responsibility payment is that it is triggered by
specific circumstances-earning a certain amount of income but not ob-
taining health insurance., 68 Because a tax "triggered by specific circum-
stances" is not contained within the Constitution, this statement begs the
question this Note seeks to explore: If the shared responsibility payment is
a tax, then what kind of tax is it?
III. THE FOUR TYPES OF FEDERAL TAXES
"Taxation is but the means by which government distributes the bur-
dens of its cost among those who enjoy its benefits."6 9 Congress's power to
tax derives from several sources in the Constitution.7 ° With that being said,
every tax must still be in accordance with the Constitution. A few of the
main sources of Congress's power to tax are relevant to the discussion of
whether the shared responsibility payment is a tax. First, Article I, Section
8, Clause 1 states that "Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes,
Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common
Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts
and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States."71 Second, Ar-
ticle I, Section 9, Clause 4 states that: "No Capitation, or other direct, Tax
shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein
before directed to be taken."7 With these two constitutional provisions
enclosed in Article 1, it seems that three - and only three - unique and
separate types of federal taxes emerge: duties, excises, and direct taxes. In
fact, as stated in Davis v. Boston & M. R. Co., "[i]t is well settled that
taxation by Congress is limited to those forms of taxes described in section
67. Id. at 2595-97.
68. Id. at 2599 (emphasis added).
69. Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 143 (1938).
70. See generally U.S. CONST.
71. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
72. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4.
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8 of article 1 of the Constitution .... "7 The court in Davis further expli-
cated that:
If [the tax imposed is not within the meaning of Article 1,
Section 8 of the Federal Constitution], it is not a tax that
Congress is authorized to levy. No other provisions of the
Constitution than [S]ection 8 of [A]rticle 1 give any powers
to Congress to levy taxes and the kind of taxes it might levy
are expressly defined therein as direct taxes, duties, imposts,
and excise taxes, and these can only be levied to pay the
debts and provide for the common defense and general wel-
fare of the United States.
74
This premise gains further supplement from what the Supreme Court
stated in the landmark tax case of Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.:
"[A]lithough there have been, from time to time, intimations that there
might be some tax which was not a direct tax, nor included under the words
'duties, imports, and excises,' such a tax, for more than 100 years of na-
tional existence, has as yet remained undiscovered .... "7 Of course, the
fourth and final tax that was eventually "discovered" and incorporated into
American tax law was the federal income tax. Therefore, pursuant to the
Sixteenth Amendment, Congress has the power to tax incomes: "The Con-
gress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever
source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and with-
out regard to any census or enumeration.
'76
With these sources of power in mind, there are four types of taxes
authorized by the Constitution: duties, excises, direct taxes, and the income
tax. Each tax incorporates certain characteristics and traits and leads to the
ultimate question: What kind of tax is Obamacare?
A. Duties
The first type of tax permitted by the Constitution is a duty. The
evolution of the legal jurisprudence of duties is among the most straightfor-
ward in federal tax law. The Constitution authorizes the federal govern-
ment to lay and collect duties pursuant to Article I, Section 8, Clause 1.7
7
Taking that into account, the Supreme Court has clearly held that, "the
words . . . 'duties, imposts and excises' . . . were used in the [C]onstitution
in their natural and obvious sense. ' 78 While a duty in its most obvious
73. Davis v. Bos. & M. R. Co., 89 F.2d 368, 373 (1st Cir. 1937).
74. Id.
75. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 557 (1895), overruled by South Carolina
v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988) and vacated on reargument, 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
76. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
77. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
78. Pollock, 157 U.S. at 557.
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sense is simply a tax on imports, the Court in Thomas v. United States pro-
vided two points. First, the Court stated that a duty has no precise defini-
tion. Second, the Court seemed to broaden the scope of a duty by
enumerating things that a duty could tax: "There is no occasion to attempt
to confine the words duties, imposts, and excises to the limits of precise
definition. We think that they were used comprehensively to cover cus-
toms and excise duties imposed on importation, consumption, manufac-
ture . . . ,,9
The Supreme Court has provided both a description and purpose of
duties in several other cases, such as Brown v. Maryland and Hooven &
Allison Co. v. Evatt. In Brown, the Supreme Court stated that only the
federal government could tax imports:
States are prohibited, unless with the consent of Congress,
from laying any imposts or duties on imports or exports, ex-
cept what may be absolutely necessary for executing their
inspection laws; and are, also, without such consent, forbid-
den to impose any duty upon tonnage. The effect of this
prohibition, coupled with the general grant of the taxing
power ... is to vest in the national government an exclusive
right to the commercial imposts of the country.80
Nearly one hundred years later in Hooven, the Supreme Court reiter-
ated that duties were construed as taxes on imported goods and that only
the federal government could enforce them:
The Constitution confers on Congress the power to lay and
collect import duties, [Article] I, [Section] 8, and provides
that "No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress,
lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except
what may be absolutely necessary for executing it's inspec-
tion Laws .... . These provisions were intended to confer
on the national government the exclusive power to tax im-
portations of goods into the United States. That the consti-
tutional prohibition necessarily extends to state taxation of
things imported, after their arrival here and so long as they
remain imports, sufficiently appears from the language of
the constitutional provision itself .... 8'
Furthermore, the word "impost" has also been construed to fit the
same meaning of a duty for purposes of federal taxation. In the case of
Woodruff v. Parham, the Supreme Court, while discussing the Constitu-
tion's Taxing and Spending Clause, stated:
79. Thomas v. United States, 192 U.S. 363, 370 (1904).
80. Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. 419, 421 (1827).
81. Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652, 655-56 (1945) (internal citation omitted) (quot-
ing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2.), overruled by Limbach v. Hooven & Allison Co., 466 U.S. 353 (1984).
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[T]he word imports, as used in the clause now under consid-
eration, is defined, both on the authority of the lexicons and
of usage, to be articles brought into the country; and impost
is there said to be a duty, custom, or tax levied on articles
brought into the country. In the ordinary use of these terms
at this day, no one would, for a moment, think of them as
having relation to any other articles than those brought
from a country foreign to the United States ... 82
The power to tax in the form of duties or imposts refers to taxes on
imported goods. The next tax contained within the Taxing and Spending
Clause is the excise tax.
B. Excises
The second type of tax permitted by the Constitution is an excise.83
Black's Law Dictionary defines an excise as a "tax imposed on the manu-
facture, sale, or use of goods (such as a cigarette tax), or on an occupation
or activity (such as a license tax or an attorney occupation fee)."8 4 Al-
though an excise tax is relatively straightforward, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in United States v. 4,432 Mastercases of
Cigarettes, More Or Less used this definition to further explicate what an
excise is by differentiating it from a property tax:
An excise tax ... is one "imposed on the performance of an
act ... or the enjoyment of a privilege." The quintessential
excise tax in our country is the sales tax. An excise tax, be-
cause it is based on a particular transaction or activity, can
be imposed only once per act, whereas an ad valorem prop-
erty tax can be imposed annually, as is typical of property
taxes.
Because there is so much manufacture, sale, and use of goods, as well
as so many occupations and activities that could fall within the scope of
facing the excise tax, an exhaustive list of excises could never be compiled.
Instead, broad categories illustrate the bounds of the excise tax. As stated
in 4,432 Mastercases, the most common form of excise tax in America is the
state general sales tax.86 The sales tax, as described by the Supreme Court
in Federal Land Bank of St. Paul v. Bismarck Lumber Co., is a tax on the
sale or purchase of an entity.87 Another type of excise tax is the estate tax.
In United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, the Supreme Court again made the
82. Woodruff v. Parham, 75 U.S. 123, 131 (1868).
83. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
84. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 646 (9th ed. 2009).
85. United States v. 4,432 Mastercases of Cigarettes, More Or Less, 448 F.3d 1168, 1185 (9th Cir.
2006) (internal citations omitted) (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 646 (9th ed. 2009)).
86. Id.
87. See Fed. Land Bank of St. Paul v. Bismarck Lumber Co., 314 U.S. 95, 101 (1941).
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distinction between an ad volorem tax and an excise by stating, "an excise
tax . .. is levied upon the use or transfer of property even though it might
be measured by the property's value ... The estate tax is a form of excise
tax."
88
While such an analysis is not by any means all-inclusive, the preceding
case history demonstrates a simple point regarding excises: one must en-
gage in an activity in order to face an excise tax. For example, an excise is
imposed on taxpayers if they buy products such as cigarettes or gasoline.
They are also similarly taxed if they engage in certain activities like hunting
or driving. Because the taxpayer is engaging in such an activity, the gov-
ernment has the power to tax them. Therefore, the key test of whether an
excise can be imposed on the taxpayer is whether the taxpayer is engaged
in an activity.
C. Direct Taxes
The third of the three permissible taxes under the federal Constitution
is a direct tax. 9 As stated in Article I, Section 9, "No Capitation, or other
direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration
herein before directed to be taken."9 ° Black's Law Dictionary provides the
respective definitions for both a direct tax and a capitation. A direct tax is
"presumed to be borne by the person upon whom it is assessed, and not
'passed on' to some other person. Ad valorem and property taxes are di-
rect taxes." 9' A capitation is "a fixed tax levied on each person within a
jurisdiction." 92 From these two definitions alone, a direct tax is one that is
seemingly imposed upon all taxpayers proportionately.
The meaning of the direct tax was squarely addressed in the 1796 para-
digm case of Hylton v. United States.93 In that case, the defendant did not
pay a tax on the ownership of his one hundred and twenty-five carriages,
challenging that it was not an apportioned direct tax. In upholding the tax,
the justices of the seriatim opinion provided unique insight as to what a
direct tax's limits are. Both Justice Chase and Justice Iredell held in their
respective opinions that "[a]ll direct taxes must be apportioned[; a]ll duties,
imposts, and excises must be uniform."9 The other justices also contem-
plated that only two forms of direct taxes existed, as seen in a statement by
Justice Chase: "[T]he direct taxes contemplated by the Constitution, are
only two, to wit, a capitation, or poll tax, simply, without regard to prop-
erty, profession, or any other circumstance; and a tax on [land]." 95 With
capitations and land taxes being the only two forms of direct taxes, each
has developed its own respective confines.
88. United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, 485 U.S. 351, 355 (1988).
89. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4.
90. Id.
91. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1595 (9th ed. 2009).
92. Id.
93. Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. 171 (1796).
94. Id. at 181 (opinion of Iredell, J.).
95. Id. at 175 (opinion of Chase, J.).
[VOL. 33:291
HAIL TO THE CHIEF?
Capitations, also known as poll taxes, as explained by Justice Chase in
Hylton, are imposed on all taxpayers "without regard to property, profes-
sion, or any other circumstance ... 96 Furthermore, Chief Justice Rob-
erts explained in NFIB that a capitation is "a tax that everyone must pay
simply for existing." '97 Reading these two statements together, capitations
are taxes that every single taxpayer must pay with the one restriction that
the tax is apportioned among the states. Consider the following to demon-
strate how a capitation works: If Congress chose to raise $300,000,000, it
could not impose a $1 per taxpayer capitation. Rather, it would have to
collect $6,000,000 from each of the fifty states. Because each state must
impose the tax in apportion to its population due to the population dispar-
ity, Wyoming would collect over $10 per taxpayer, and California would
collect less than 20 cents per taxpayer.
Land taxes also fall within the scope of direct taxes. The Supreme
Court in Bromley v. McCaughn stated that "taxes levied upon.., because
of their general ownership of property may be taken to be direct [taxes]."98
The Court similarly stated in Fernandez v. United States that "Congress
may tax real estate or chattels if . . . apportioned." 99 Finally, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Simmons v. United States
explained the span that a land tax could have in order to still be considered
a direct tax:
A direct tax is a tax on real or personal property, imposed
solely by reason of its being owned by the taxpayer. A tax
on the income from such property, such as a tax on rents or
the interest on bonds, is also considered a direct tax, being
basically a tax upon the ownership of property. 100
With such authority, it seems clear that direct taxes are those imposed
on every taxpayer and can be imposed for owning property or for just sim-
ply existing. The key test for determining whether a direct tax is constitu-
tional is whether it is equally apportioned.
D. The Income Tax
The fourth and final type of tax permitted by the Constitution is the
income tax. Whereas the other three preceding types of taxes discussed
herein stem from the original texts of the Constitution, the federal income
tax developed by way of constitutional amendment. 1°1 "Prior to the adop-
tion of the Sixteenth Amendment, imposition of an income tax was limited
by the application of then existing Constitutional provisions."'1 2 Those
96. Id.
97. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2599 (2012).
98. Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U.S. 124, 136 (1929).
99. Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U.S. 340, 352 (1945).
100. Simmons v. United States, 308 F.2d 160, 166 (4th Cir. 1962).
101. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
102. HERTSEL SHADIAN, 1 MERTENS LAW OF FED. INCOME TAX'N § 5:3 (2013).
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Constitutional provisions were Article I, Section 2, Clause 3; Article I, Sec-
tion 8, Clause 1; and Article I, Section 9, Clause 4.113 However, in the 1895
landmark case of Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. confronted the
question of whether the federal government could disproportionately tax
incomes.1
0 4
In Pollock, the Court wrestled with the issue of the federal govern-
ment taxing incomes in an unapportioned fashion. 115 Specifically, the
Court addressed the question: if "no unapportioned tax can be imposed
upon real estate, [can] Congress without apportionment nevertheless im-
pose taxes upon such real estate under the guise of an annual tax upon its
rents or income?"'0 6 Upon its analysis of whether Congress's power
stretched that far, the Court eventually held that such a scheme was "in
violation of the constitution, and ... invalid."10 7 Leading up to its ultimate
conclusion, the Court reasoned that "under the state system of taxation, all
taxes on real estate or personal property or the rents or incomes thereof
[are] direct taxes, [and] that the rules of apportionment and of uniformity
were adopted in view of that distinction "0.... 18 Because the tax that
Congress imposed was not apportioned, it could not be considered a direct
tax, and therefore not within the scope of Congress's taxing power. In re-
sponse, Congress proposed the Sixteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution, which was eventually ratified on February 3, 1913.109
The Sixteenth Amendment states that "Congress shall have power to
lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without
apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census
or enumeration"'"° - effectively nullifying the Court's holding in Pollock.
While the amendment's text is straightforward, the true inquiry is deci-
phering what Congress can classify as income to be taxed. Two sources
help taxpayers with that dilemma: the Supreme Court's test for determin-
ing income from Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Company and Section
61(a) of the Internal Revenue Code.
In Glenshaw Glass, two separate cases were consolidated, as the facts
in both were that the defendants did not report awards of punitive damages
as income."' The Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service sued,
arguing that these funds were income and therefore taxable."' 2 The Su-
preme Court, in holding that the defendants' punitive damage awards were
in fact income, created a three-element test to determine the existence of
income: Income exists when the taxpayer has (1) an "undeniable accession
103. Id.; see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4.
104. Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 580 (1895).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 583.
108. Id. at 573-74.
109. Ellen Terrell, History of the US Income Tax (Feb. 2004), http://www.loc.gov/rr/business/hot
topic/irs-history.html. (last accessed Oct. 30, 2014).
110. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
111. Comm'r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 427-28 (1955).
112. Id.
[VOL. 33:291
HAIL TO THE CHIEF?
to wealth," (2) "clearly realized," (3) "over which the taxpayer [has] com-
plete dominion.,
113
The next source to help a taxpayer determine what can be considered
income is Section 61(a) of the Internal Revenue Code. This Section states
that "gross income means all income from whatever source derived." '114
Section 61(a) further provides that gross income includes, but is not limited
to:
Compensation for services, including fees, commission,
fringe benefits, and similar items; gross income derived from
business; gains derived from dealings in property; interest;
rents; royalties; dividends; alimony and separate mainte-
nance payments; annuities; income from life insurance and
endowment contracts; pensions; income from discharge of
indebtedness; distributive share of partnership gross in-
come; income in respect of a decedent; and income from an
interest in an estate or trust.
115
For purposes of analyzing the income tax, it is important to keep a
simple logic in mind. First, being subjected to the income tax is condi-
tioned on the premise of having income to be taxed. Second, income is
broadly defined to mean any "income from whatever source derived"' 6 or
any "undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly realized, over which the tax-
payers have complete dominion."' 17 Therefore, the question will become
whether the forbearance of the purchase of health insurance can be consid-
ered income to be taxed.
IV. WHAT TYPE OF TAX IS OBAMACARE?
A. The Shared Responsibility Payment Is Not A Duty
Perhaps the easiest application of comparing the shared responsibility
payment to the four permitted types of federal taxes comes through the
duty. As discussed above, a duty is essentially a tax on an imported good.
Considering that health insurance is neither a good nor can be imported
from a foreign country, a duty could not even be imposed on a taxpayer
who actually did purchase health insurance. To the contrary, in order to
trigger the shared responsibility payment, a taxpayer must refrain from
purchasing health insurance. Because the power to tax in the form of du-
ties refers to taxes on imported goods and cannot apply to the purely do-
mestic matter of residents purchasing or not purchasing health insurance,
the shared responsibility payment is not a duty.
113. Id. at 431.
114. I.R.C. § 61 (2012).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. at 431.
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B. The Shared Responsibility Payment Is Not An Excise
The closest fit that the shared responsibility payment has to con-
forming to any of the four permitted federal taxes is an excise tax. Reiter-
ating its basic definition, an excise is "a tax imposed on the manufacture,
sale, or use of goods, or on an occupation or activity."' 18 Because not buy-
ing health insurance is not an occupation and does not involve manufactur-
ing, selling, or using a good, the lone argument would have to be that the
forbearance of purchasing health insurance is an activity. However, this
argument is without merit because activities require one to actually engage,
be active, and ultimately do something. Looking to the plain meaning of
the word, the Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines "activity" as "the qual-
ity or state of being active; vigorous or energetic action; an active force; a
pursuit in which a person is active.""' 9 The argument that the forbearance
or refusal of engaging in an activity could in and of itself be considered an
activity is completely unfounded and irrational. Surely, one would never
say that not being alive is somehow the activity of being dead. Similarly,
one would also not say that someone who is holding his breath is perform-
ing the activity of not breathing. To the contrary, that person would in-
stead be actively holding his breath.
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit's statement in 4,432 Mastercases that
an excise is a tax "imposed on the performance of an act ... or the enjoy-
ment of a privilege' 20 demonstrates how feeble the argument is that inac-
tivity is actually activity. By not acting to purchase health insurance, a
taxpayer is neither performing the act of buying health insurance, nor en-
joying the privilege of having it. To the contrary, an excise could only be
imposed on those taxpayers who did acquire health insurance.
It is also worth noting that Chief Justice Roberts seemingly touched on
the excise tax in his reasoning in NFIB. Before stating that "taxes that seek
to influence conduct are nothing new," the Chief Justice asserted that the
shared responsibility payment was most likely "intended to affect individ-
ual conduct.' 121 He goes on further to say that, in the present-day, "federal
and state taxes can compose more than half the retail price of cigarettes,
not just to raise more money, but to encourage people to quit smoking. "122
While the Chief Justice is absolutely correct, a crucial distinction must be
made. The federal and state governments have the constitutional power to
tax cigarettes because people are actively engaging in buying them. Alter-
natively, the federal and state governments do not have the power to tax
those who do not buy cigarettes. The Chief Justice is correct in stating that
the government's taxing power has the ability "to influence conduct,
1' 23
118. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 646 (9th ed. 2009).
119. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 54 (Frederick Mish ed. 9th ed. 1986).
120. United States v. 4,432 Mastercases of Cigarettes, More Or Less, 448 F.3d 1168, 1185 (9th Cir.
2006).
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but there is a stark contrast between influencing conduct and compelling it.
Americans may receive tax credits for purchasing a variety of items, but
that is completely different from the government imposing a tax on those
who do not make the purchase. If the government were to give firearm
purchasers a tax credit, such action would be within its power to do so. But
if it also imposed a tax on all taxpayers who did not purchase a firearm,
that would be outside the scope of the government's power. Both of these
scenarios would undoubtedly influence individual conduct, but only the
former is constitutional.
Finally, in his discussion of the government's commerce clause argu-
ment, the Chief Justice states, "As expansive as our cases construing the
scope of the commerce power have been, they all have one thing in com-
mon: They uniformly describe the power as reaching 'activity." 124 The
Chief Justice went on to hold that,
The individual mandate, however, does not regulate existing
commercial activity. It instead compels individuals to be-
come active in commerce by purchasing a product, on the
ground that their failure to do so affects interstate com-
merce. Construing the Commerce Clause to permit Con-
gress to regulate individuals precisely because they are
doing nothing would open a new and potentially vast do-
main to congressional authority.'25
With that, the Chief Justice has provided the necessary reasoning to
conclude that the shared responsibility payment can in no way, shape, or
form be considered an excise, as the Court has explicitly stated that an
individual not complying with the individual mandate is not engaged in an
activity.
C. The Shared Responsibility Payment Is Not A Direct Tax
The shared responsibility payment is also not a direct tax. The plain-
tiffs' argument in NFIB was that "if the individual mandate imposes a tax,
it is a direct tax, and it is unconstitutional because Congress made no effort
to apportion it among the states."' 26 After discussing the background of
direct taxes, Chief Justice Roberts concluded that
A tax on going without health insurance does not fall within
any recognized category of direct tax. It is not a capitation.
Capitations are taxes paid by every person, 'without regard
to property, profession, or any other circumstance.' The
whole point of the shared responsibility payment is that it is
triggered by specific circumstances-earning a certain
124. Id. at 2587.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 2598.
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amount of income but not obtaining health insurance. The
payment is also plainly not a tax on the ownership of land or
personal property. The shared responsibility payment is
thus not a direct tax that must be apportioned among the
several States.127
The Chief Justice's reasoning makes perfect sense. The shared respon-
sibility payment is clearly not a tax on property because the taxpayer has
actually refused to buy something. Nor can it be a direct tax because
health insurance - let alone the lack of health insurance - cannot be con-
sidered real estate. Lastly, because not every taxpayer is subject to the
shared responsibility payment, the shared responsibility payment cannot be
considered a capitation. A capitation is "a tax that everyone must pay sim-
ply for existing., 128 Because some taxpayers will comply with the individ-
ual mandate and never face it, not all taxpayers will have to pay it. The fact
that everyone will not pay it makes it impossible for the shared responsibil-
ity payment to be a capitation. Therefore, because the shared responsibil-
ity payment is not a direct tax, its last and final chance for constitutional
survival rests on whether it is an income tax.
D. The Shared Responsibility Payment Is Not An Income Tax
The final type of tax that the shared responsibility payment could be is
an income tax. Therefore, the threshold question is whether the election
not to purchase something - in this case health insurance - can be consid-
ered taxable income. Section 61(a) of the Internal Revenue Code, while
extremely broad, gives neither hint nor indication that the refusal to
purchase something can be considered income. Furthermore, by applying
the Supreme Court's Glenshaw Glass test, the answer becomes definitive: a
taxpayer who does not purchase something realizes no accession to wealth.
Therefore, not doing something - in this case, not purchasing health insur-
ance - is not and cannot be considered income. As a result, the shared
responsibility payment cannot be considered an income tax and, conse-
quently, not a tax at all.
V. THE NEXT STEP FOR OPPONENTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE
Chief Justice Roberts' holding in NFIB created a political and legal
firestorm, which upset mostly the country's Republicans and conserva-
tives.129 Both the topic analyzed and question presented in this Note, how-
ever, may provide opponents to both Obamacare's individual mandate and
shared responsibility payment with some hope for the future. While Chief
127. Id, at 2599.
128. Id.
129. David Horsey, John Roberts saves 'Obamacare,' Enrages Tea Party Conservatives, L.A.
TIMES, Jun. 29, 2012, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jun/29/nation/la-na-tt-john-roberts-
20120628.
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Justice Roberts won the battle for Obamacare,"3 ° his holding on the tax
power has the potential to start a new legal war. The simplest and most
obvious way to test the substance of this Note's argument is to sue over it.
Because this lawsuit would stem from the decision in NFIB, four different
jurisdictional and procedural issues need to be addressed: standing, res
judicata, collateral estoppel, and stare decisis.
A. Standing
The concept of standing "focuses on the plaintiff and asks whether the
plaintiff is entitled to have the Court's power exercised on its behalf...
[and] asks whether the plaintiff may assert the claim." '131 "This turns on...
concerns such as concrete adversariness, injury, [and] a personal stake in
the outcome .... ".132 A paradigm case in standing jurisprudence is United
States v. Student Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures. In that case,
the plaintiffs sued "the United States and the [Interstate Commerce] Com-
mission ... seeking... a preliminary injunction to restrain enforcement of
the Commission's [nationwide freight rate increase]" in order "to enhance
the quality of the human environment for its members, and for all citi-
zens." 133 Before eventually concluding that the plaintiffs had standing, the
Supreme Court provided the legal test to determine whether a plaintiff
does have standing: "The party seeking review [must] be himself among the
injured, for it is this requirement that gives a litigant a direct stake in the
controversy and prevents the judicial process from becoming no more than
a vehicle for the vindication of the value interests of concerned
bystanders.
1 34
For purposes of a plaintiff challenging whether the shared responsibil-
ity payment is constitutional, the taxpayer would have to go without health
insurance and face the tax. At that point, the plaintiff would have a direct
stake in the controversy and fulfill the standing requirement.
130. While I do not necessarily adopt it, I would like to draw attention to Dr. Charles Krautham-
mer's analysis of Chief Justice Roberts' possible mindset in making his decision to ultimately save
Obamacare. See Charles Krauthammer, Why Roberts Did It, WASH. POST, Jun. 28, 2012, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/charles-krauthammer-why-roberts-didit/2012/06/28/gJQA4X
g9V story.html. Specifically, Dr. Krauthammer opines that Chief Justice Roberts' tax holding in NFIB
is "one of the great constitutional finesses of all time. [Chief Justice Roberts] managed to uphold the
central conservative argument against Obamacare, while at the same time finding a narrow definitional
dodge to uphold the law - and thus prevented the court from being seen as having overturned, presum-
ably on political grounds, the signature legislation of the administration. Why did he do it? Because he
carries two identities. Jurisprudentially, he is a constitutional conservative. Institutionally, he is chief
justice and sees himself as uniquely entrusted with the custodianship of the court's legitimacy, reputa-
tion[,] and stature." Id.
131. DENNIS ALAN OLSON, CASES ON CONSTITUIONAL LAW 61 (2010).
132. Id.
133. United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 678
(1973).
134. Id. at 687.
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B. Res Judicata
The next hurdle is the concept of res judicata - also known as claim
preclusion. Res judicata "treats a judgment, once rendered, as the full
measure of relief to be accorded between the same parties on the same
'claim' or 'cause of action.' ... When the plaintiff obtains a judgment in his
favor . . . he may seek no further relief on that claim in a separate ac-
tion." '135 "Under these rules of claim preclusion, the effect of a judgment
extends to the litigation of all issues relevant to the same claim between the
same parties, whether or not raised at trial." '36 "The aim of claim preclu-
sion is thus to avoid multiple suits on identical entitlements or obligations
between the same parties, accompanied, as they would be, by the redeter-
mination of identical issues .... 137
Res judicata prohibits the NFIB plaintiffs from relitigating their prior
claims. However, the issue raised in this Note was not presented and was
not within the scope or potential scope of the original challenge. There-
fore, no res judicata bar exists.
C. Collateral Estoppel
The third obstacle for the plaintiff challenging the shared responsibil-
ity payment's constitutionality is collateral estoppel - also known as issue
preclusion. Collateral estoppel "bars the relitigation of issues actually ad-
judicated, and essential to the judgment, in a prior litigation between the
same parties."' 38 As the Supreme Court stated in Ashe v. Swenson, "when
an issue of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final
judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same parties in
any future lawsuit."' 39
For purposes of a plaintiff challenging the shared responsibly payment,
collateral estoppel will not bar the lawsuit because the issue the plaintiff
will present will have never been litigated. Chief Justice Roberts con-
cluded that the shared responsibility payment was a tax, but he never ad-
dressed its constitutionality nor specified which of the four permitted
federal taxes it is. In fact, the plaintiffs in NFIB only argued that if it were
a tax, it would be an unconstitutional form of a direct tax 4 ' - which Chief
Justice Roberts addressed and eventually dismissed. 141 Furthermore, the
fact that the tax has yet to be imposed on a single taxpayer demonstrates
the impossibility that this issue could have been litigated. Because the con-
stitutionality of this tax has never been challenged, collateral estoppel does
not bar this lawsuit from proceeding.
135. EDWARD COOPER § 4402 THE TERMINOLOGY OF RES JUDICATA, 18 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Juris.




139. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970).
140. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2598 (2012).
141. Id. at 2599.
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D. Stare Decisis
The final issue a plaintiff challenging the shared responsibility pay-
ment's constitutionality will have is stare decisis. Stare decisis, a Latin term
meaning "to stand by things decided," is a "doctrine of precedent, under
which a court must follow earlier judicial decisions when the same points
arise again in litigation.' 1 42 The concept is "based on a simple moral
maxim: the idea that judges should treat like cases alike . . . [and] that a
decision made by a court is a 'binding precedent' that the court itself and
all inferior courts in the same jurisdiction are obligated to follow."'1 43 Stare
decisis is also said to promote "the 'rule of law,' since it limits the discretion
of judges and keeps the legal system predictable and stable over time."' 44
While the Court heard and decided arguments regarding the shared re-
sponsibility payment, it did not address the question that this Note presents
- thus rendering stare decisis a non-issue. Even if an argument were made
that precedent would control, however, the Supreme Court has explicitly
stated that deciding a constitutional issue correctly is more important than
its adherence to stare decisis.
145
While the plaintiff will have standing and will not be barred by either
res judicata or collateral estoppel, the biggest barrier in the way of getting
to the Supreme Court will be the Court itself. After all of the hype and
focus the Court faced before, during, and after its decision in NFIB, it is
hard to imagine why the Court would once again want to entertain the
media circus it did during March and June of 2012. However, because this
Note's argument is of crucial constitutional, economic, political, and social
importance, the Court should and must hear a case on the constitutionality
of imposing a tax on those who choose not to purchase health insurance.
VI. CONCLUSION
When thinking of legislation passed this century with the same magni-
tude of socio-economic, political, and legal significance as Obamacare,
FDR's New Deal and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 come to mind. But no
piece of legislation has faced more anticipation upon of the Supreme
Court's review than Obamacare. While Chief Justice Roberts should be
given credit for the difficult task of trying to find any constitutional brace
for upholding Obamacare, his analysis and ultimate conclusion that the
142. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1536 (9th ed. 2009).
143. F.E. Guerra-Pujol, Is Stare Decisis a Sand Castle? An Open Letter to My Law Professor
Colleagues, ARIZ. ST. L.J. (Oct. 28, 2014), http://arizonastatelawjoumal.org/is-stare-decisis-a-sand-cas
tle-an-open-letter-to-my-law-professor-colleagues/.
144. Id.
145. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671 (1974) ("Since we deal with a constitutional question,
we are less constrained by the principle of stare decisis than we are in other areas of the law"); Arizona
v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 348 (2009) ("The doctrine of stare decisis is of course 'essential to the respect
accorded to the judgments of the Court and to the stability of the law,' but it does not compel us to
follow a past decision when its rationale no longer withstands 'careful analysis.'").
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shared responsibility payment is a tax are both wrong.14 6 Insomuch as
there are four types of taxes authorized by the Constitution - duties, ex-
cises, direct taxes, and the income tax - the shared responsibility payment
cannot "reasonably be characterized as a tax."'4 7 Failure to purchase
health insurance is clearly not an imported foreign good, thus eliminating
the chance that it is a duty. Failure to purchase health insurance cannot be
considered an excise tax because the justification behind excises is that an
individual did engage and purchase something. To trigger the shared re-
sponsibility payment, however, a taxpayer must be inactive and do nothing.
Moreover, as Chief Justice Roberts himself made clear in NFIB, the shared
responsibility payment is neither a direct tax nor a capitation.'48 Finally,
while the shared responsibility payment is calculated based on an individ-
ual's income and collected in a similar manner as the income tax, the re-
fusal to buy health insurance cannot be considered income to be taxed.
Because the shared responsibility payment does not fall within the
scope of being a duty, excise, direct tax, or income tax, it would seem that
the Court has created a new tax - a tax "triggered by specific circum-
stances."' 49 While this label has neither an overarching title nor constitu-
tional support, Chief Justice Roberts' inadvertent creation seems to spawn
the argument that the holding in NFIB surpasses the scope of judicial
power and is unconstitutional. Even more controversial is how this holding
seemingly and eerily clashes with a short excerpt from the Chief Justice's
opinion:
[A]lthough the breadth of Congress's power to tax is greater
than its power to regulate commerce, the taxing power does
not give Congress the same degree of control over individ-
ual behavior. Once we recognize that Congress may regu-
late a particular decision under the Commerce Clause, the
Federal Government can bring its full weight to bear. Con-
gress may simply command individuals to do as it directs.5 °
146. While I ultimately disagree with Chief Justice Roberts' conclusion, I would like to highlight
one of the earliest statements in his opinion which I consider to be very favorable and encouraging to
those of us who are constitutional conservatives both legally and politically speaking: "Members of this
Court are vested with the authority to interpret the law; we possess neither the expertise nor the pre-
rogative to make policy judgments. Those decisions are entrusted to our Nation's elected leaders, who
can be thrown out of office if the people disagree with them. It is not our job to protect the people from
the consequences of their political choices." Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2579
(2012) (emphasis added). In other words, Chief Justice Roberts himself is pronouncing (and seemingly
endorsing) the old political maxim that "elections have consequences." This, in my opinion, demon-
strates that the Roberts Court will continue to correctly trend toward the "restoration of textual
supremacy and respect for popular sovereignty" even when the conclusion to be reached is one that is
objectionable by either a single Justice or by the Court as a whole for reasons beyond the scope of pure
constitutional interpretation. Dennis Alan Olson, Address at the University of Detroit Mercy School of
Law Federalist Society Meeting: Obamacare, Popular Sovereignty, and Judicial Review (Sept. 25, 2012).
147. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2600 (2012).
148. Id. at 2599.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 2600.
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Such a statement, while made in the context of the Commerce Clause, can
be directly related to Congress' "new" taxing power.
The Framers only contemplated three types of taxes in the original
Constitution. 151 A fourth was realized only after the ratification of the Six-
teenth Amendment. 152 Because of the holding in NFIB, the Court has left
the door open not to the question of what Congress can tax, but instead of
what it can't. If the answer is as simple as anything "triggered by specific
circumstances, 153 then perhaps Chief Justice Roberts misjudged in saying
that "the taxing power does not give Congress the same degree of control
over individual behavior" as its power to regulate commerce.154 Perhaps
the best evidence of the Chief Justice's misstatement is his own words in
the beginning of the prevailing opinion: "[Congress' taxing power] gives
the Federal Government considerable influence even in areas where it can-
not directly regulate. The Federal Government may enact a tax on an ac-
tivity that it cannot authorize, forbid, or otherwise control."' 55 With that, it
seems that the conventional legal theory that Congress's most powerful in-
strument to control is in fact not the Commerce power. Instead, the Chief
Justice has made it clear that Congress's power to tax whatever it chooses,
whenever it chooses, is its ultimate trump card in regulating American citi-
zens' behavior, activity, and now, pursuant to NFIB, people's inactivity.
Looking forward, what legal authority is there to stop Congress from
taxing not just all activity but even inactivity? What will opponents point to
in their resistance to being taxed after Congress creates a mandate to buy
funeral insurance, healthy food, or even an environmentally friendly car?
Before NFIB, the main defense would have been the Constitution. Today,
however, such a barrier is either nonexistent or unknown.
In his last excerpt in discussing the tax question, the Chief Justice
states that "[t]he Affordable Care Act's requirement that certain individu-
als pay a financial penalty for not obtaining health insurance may reasona-
bly be characterized as a tax. Because the Constitution permits such a tax,
it is not our role to forbid it, or to pass upon its wisdom or fairness."' 56
After taking into account the reasoning behind the holding in NFIB, the
esteem of the prevailing opinion's members, and the foregoing analysis
given in this Note, I must dispute this decision's wisdom and fairness and
respectfully dissent.
Thankfully, there is a way to possibly prevent Congress from ever ex-
ploiting the American people with the expanded taxing power it was
granted in NFIB. If a single taxpayer refuses to purchase health insurance
and challenges the constitutionality of the shared responsibility payment,
the judiciary will have to decide whether this tax, "triggered by specific
151. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4.
152. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
153. Nat'l Fed'n ofIndep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2599.
154. Id. at 2600 (emphasis added).
155. Id. at 2579 (emphasis added).
156. Id. at 2600.
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circumstances, 157 falls within the scope of a duty, excise, direct tax, or in-
come tax. It is my belief that it does not fall within any of these permitted
taxes, that the courts will conclude it does not, and that the Supreme Court
would correct its miscalculation from NFIB. While the battle was lost, it is
possible that the war is not entirely over. But the only way to find out is to
again challenge the legislative leviathan known as Obamacare, and time is
of the essence.
157. Id. at 2599.
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